



सेतुंस्तर दुस्तरान् अक्रोधेन क्रोधं सत्येनानृतम् ।

"Cross the passes so difficult to cross.
(Conquer) wrath with peace ; untruth with truth."

Sāma-Veda.

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BECOME THAT WHICH THOU ART

The oneness of the soul with the Self is already a fact, and not a thing that requires a further effort to bring it about; therefore the recognition of the truth of the text "That thou Art" is sufficient to put an end to the personality of the soul, in the same way as the recognition of the piece of rope is sufficient to abolish the snake that fictitiously represents itself in place of the piece of rope. No sooner is the personality of the soul denied than the whole empirical habitual order of life disappears with it, to make up which the lower and plural manifestation of the self falsely presents itself.

Thus Shankara, the great sage of India presents in a veritable nutshell the kernel of his teachings. It contains not only a theory but also a practice to be daily carried out. Just as for the good health of the body physical exercise is necessary, so for the health of the man himself daily regular discipline is equally necessary. The theory, its practice and the result accruing, are all contained in the above-quoted terse exposition. To understand

it better we should analyse it and note the following propositions:—

(a) Spirit and soul are not one, but two; yet an identity subsists between them; though two, they should never be separated.

(b) Soul and personality are two, not one; and the identification of the former with the latter leads to the death of the soul; they should ever be distinguished and separated.

(c) Spirit (That) and soul (thou) are indissolubly linked, and a constant remembrance of the fact will be achieved by the aid of the formula or mantra—That thou Art: *Tat tvam Asi.*

(d) Such daily practice puts an end to the personality—the *persona* or mask of the soul; the death of the personality frees the soul and enables it to know itself as the Spirit, as Omnipresent Life.

The early Christian philosophers distinguished between soul and Spirit; in their psychology

man was a triad of body, soul and Spirit. Christian theologians materialized the teaching, and the indissoluble link between soul and Spirit was forgotten. In place of the Spirit, omnipresent and therefore within man's heart, an anthropomorphic God without was instituted. From that corrupting influence Christendom is not yet freed. Other theologies have produced a similar corruption in other lands.

Prayer and praise are offered to an extra-cosmic Personal God, who acts cruelly in spite of his love, and who creates chaos and allows wickedness to flourish in spite of his omniscience. Propitiating such an idol, man has become intensely personal, superstitious and cruel. The physical results of psychical beliefs are even less recognized than are the physiological results of psychological opinions on the human corpus and bodily health. The moral weakness engendered by a belief in an anthropomorphic God is great indeed. Even the achievements of materialistic science have not freed the masses from this folly. Human hearts are empty, as churches are empty, of divinity. The efflorescence of such religious beliefs is to be noticed in our civilization which regards the human personality as sacrosanct. The personality has usurped the authority of the soul and in its borrowed robes rules with cunning and craft. The Spirit has become merely a metaphorical expression, applied for the most part to some undefined

force which springs from the personality. Personality is considered to be the parent of the soul and Spirit.

Modern habits and thoughts have led men in a direction opposite from that which Shankara recommended. Personality of the soul is not denied, be it noted, while the Spirit behind and within the soul is denied. When people use the phrase "self-expression," they mean the creative activity of the personal self—the mask of the soul. People make ropes and call them serpents and either fear them like children or juggle with them like *madāris*.

Man is threefold: (1) animal man, (2) rational man, and (3) divine man. At present the animal man has conquered his rational being to such an extent that the divinity in him has retired into silence and darkness. The rational man must reclaim his lost position; and Shankara teaches that the first act in rational living is for man to deny the place of power to the personality or animal man. We must not, however, overlook the fact, as some false pietists of bewildered soul in India have done, that the animal man possesses power to create. Even the spiritually dead enjoy all their delights; they have intellectual power and attainments, and can be intensely active. As alcohol exhilarates, so animal-creativity produces a sense of exaltation, strong though temporary, and thus people are glamourised and mistake the demoniac for the divine.

The soul of our civilization is *kama-manas*, animal-man. Our race has yet to learn that *a high development of the intellectual faculties does not imply spiritual and true life.*

The very act of denial which Shankara advocates, if rationally performed, produces a great change in one's attitude to the whole of life. Mere denial of evil or disease produces its own kind of glamour, as also the absolution pronounced on the penitent by a priest. In the rational denial man finds the light of the Father-Confessor within himself, and if he persists in his task he will soon know himself as one newly born.

What stands in the way of the intelligent modern man taking that rational position? Animal delights; to multitudes of men and women these constitute the highest ideal of human happiness. The tireless pursuit of riches, of the amusements and entertainments of social life; the cultivation of graces of manner, of taste in dress, of social preferment, of scientific distinction, intoxicate and enrapture these dead-alive.

People generally are not afflicted with maleficence; rarely does a man commit wickedness deliberately and of set purpose. For the most part man suffers from the defects of his quality, which shows itself remarkably in

the depth of the sense of humour he possesses. Modern philosophers and psycho-physiologists are not agreed about the genesis of the sense of humour or about the manner of its expressions. According to the ancients and in the Esoteric philosophy, man's sense of humour is a constituent of his psychological nature and produces physiological effects. By his thoughts and feelings, by his will-full or will-less actions, each person attracts to himself elementals, which are forces of Nature, personified as gnomes, undines, sylphs and salamanders; these forces manufacture certain "fluids" named humours, one of which disproportionately predominating marks a man as phlegmatic or sanguine or choleric or melancholic. The quantity and quality of these elemental forces are attracted by men unconsciously to themselves, whereas they are servile agents of the trained occultist. Men and women under the sway of their personal self-centredness are obsessed by these forces which intoxicate them and goad them to chase the shadows of life.

Courage is required in abandoning this broad road of shades for the strait and narrow path of Life. Mortification and sacrifice are needed if a man is to give up his life, so that he may Live.

THE FAMILY

[B. M. is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular: it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it. We think our readers will find real inspiration in this *new* series.—EDS.]

From the influence of impiety the females of a family grow vicious; and from women that are become vicious arises the confusion of castes.—*Bhagavad-Gita*, I, 41.

Such is the reason Arjuna advances to Krishna in the very first chapter; he explains his argument in subsequent verses. Not as an excuse for his timidity does Arjuna wear the mask of a philosopher. Hero of a thousand battles, not a trace of cowardice remained in his blood. What was his argument? He who disturbs the peace of the family precipitates the destruction of the family. Such disturbance of family life (*Kula-dharma*) culminates in the loss of virtue of the women of that family; this, in its turn, shakes the very foundations of society, because the vicious woman becomes the womb of the outcaste. Once the family dharma—laws which uphold and sustain the family—is disregarded, the larger unit, the society, is corrupted.

Arjuna reasons: If he and his brothers disturb the peace of the family even though their own relatives were evil, were over-throw-

ing justice and torturing righteousness, they themselves would be responsible for the ultimate destruction of the whole kingdom. Where was the glory and what was the good of ruling over a people who would be casteless?

Now, the *Gita* is a book of many meanings and many messages: its metaphysics and philosophy tell the story of the macrocosm, its psychology that of the microcosm; it is history concerned with weak humans, and myth concerned with mighty gods; above all it teaches the Secret Science, *i.e.* the Science of the Soul; and how? As the hidden soul in man unfolds, it hears message after message hidden in this Song of Life.

Therefore *Kula-dharma*, family-life, and corruption of women, and the arising of caste confusion—all have different meanings. Thus, there is the psychological confusion of caste in most men of to-day, for their inner aspirations do not harmonize with their de-

sires and cause confusion in body and brain. Each one of us is male-female. Just as in the body of every male the female exists in latency and *vice versa*, so also in our minds and morals, we may be male or female or both—generally both. There is a whole male line of evolution, and there is another, the female line; both these mix and mingle in the human being. Celibacy which chelas of real Gurus are called upon to practise extends to all states of consciousness; there is mental celibacy, there is emotional chastity, there is psychic virginity, there is noëtic continence, and so forth, and without these the legitimate and healthy birth of intuition cannot result. Each human being is a family in himself, and each one has to observe his own family-dharma within himself. Corruption of this particular family-dharma begets its own confusion; on the other hand, its correct observance begets the Deathless Race of Immortals. So there are different ways in which this as all other *Gita* doctrines can be interpreted. The soul, through its progressive awakenings, obtains one key and then another, which enables it to perceive these interpretations.

But let us consider the society around us in the light of this principle. Caste-destruction did take place and confusion ensued: India is said to be caste-ridden; it is with false castes. For 5000 years now the colours (*varna*) of our peoples have become mixed; for 5000 years on this sacred soil the

confusion of castes has flourished, dragging India down and down. It is notable that Krishna did not answer, did not even consider, the specific objection Arjuna raised. He began with most lofty ideas, metaphysical and ethical; and when he came to speak of castes, He mentioned *Karma*-effects of *Gunas*-qualities, according to which the colours (*varna*) of men's characters and dispositions show themselves, life after life. Moreover, caste confusion prevails all over the world, and not only in our India.

Caste-confusion is the outstanding mark of the Kaliyuga, the cycle inaugurated by Krishna. It will persist among the masses of mankind who belong to Kali-yuga. That confusion will continue to disturb family life (*Kula-dharma*), will continue to corrupt the morals of womankind, and will ultimately compel people to doubt their own ways, their reasonings, themselves even, and then set them thinking. This is what is happening in our midst, but not on any large scale, because sex evil is almost universal, and more, it is not even looked upon as evil but is considered to be a natural phenomenon. Corrupt family life of this age is the direct outcome of sex evil.

Why did Krishna inaugurate such an era? To give direction to human evolution. Teachers and Revelations (*Rishis* and *Shastras*) help men in earlier cycles; through obedience and belief they grow; they are helped by Nature, as the infant is fed by

the mother; the impulse given by Divine Incarnations and Holy Books carries them along. When that is withdrawn good living becomes mechanical and would disappear producing a greater chaos than even now exists, if Krishna did not set into motion His own wheel. The aim of Krishna then was to help men to live by conviction and not by belief. Not to allow the complete obliteration of the work of the previous Incarnations did Krishna come, but to sustain Their labour in the only right way open to Him, *viz.*, to make men rely on the impacts within themselves, impacts received by them from Teachers and Revelations. That is why Krishna is considered the most important of the avatars of Vishnu. Living in bliss within themselves, living at peace with all, people did not know for themselves what Light was. Shadows became necessary; a dark-cycle, Kali-yuga, became due; and Krishna ushered in that new era.

The second outstanding mark of this Iron Age is individualism. The way of growth is individualistic. Why? Because each man has to make his own effort, unaided by any one, save by that which he has acquired and which is within himself. Each man, each woman must remove his or her own caste-confusion, by re-establishing his or her own family-dharma.

The way out of the darkness of this age for every individual is through the family-unit. Arjuna's fear was not unfounded; but Krishna did not come to destroy family-life, *Kula-dharma*, but to help men and women establish it on the rock of knowledge, so that it can never again become mechanical, never again become a matter of belief, of tradition, of form.

Manu-Smriti, the Tradition handed down by Manu, gives the necessary information, but we must practise it intelligently, after due study and understanding.

B. M.

*Where women are honoured, there verily the Devas rejoice;
where they are not honoured, there indeed all rites are fruitless.*

—MANU-SMṚITI (Laws of Manu) iii-56

TOLSTOY'S BELIEF AND PRACTICE

[There is perhaps no other Englishman more capable of doing justice to the subject of this article than **Aylmer Maude**, Honorary Organizing Secretary of the Tolstoy Society. In him flows good Quaker blood, and he incorporates in his education Russian experience. Educated partly at Moscow, he also taught there. Then he was Manager and later Director of the Russian Carpet Company. In 1898 he helped to arrange the Doukhobors' migration to Canada. He knew Tolstoy personally and is the author of several volumes about him as well as the translator of many of the works of the great Passive Resister.—EDS.]

Tolstoy's religious opinions evolved considerably from 1879 when he wrote his *Confession*, to 1902 when he wrote *What is Religion?* But to the end of his life he held tenaciously to the precept of non-resistance which he formulated when translating the Gospels into modern Russian in 1882, and during his last twenty-five years elaborated and persistently applied to his own affairs.

Starting from the text: "Resist not him that is evil, but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also."

... Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away,"—he arrived at the conclusion that it is morally indefensible to use physical force to punish or restrain any man, and that therefore the whole structure of our social life, involving as it does the employment of armies, navies, police, prisons, and compulsory legal proceedings to maintain property rights, is harmful and wrong. In fact he regarded all employment of physical force by man to man as injurious violence.

It is not necessary to discuss that belief here, for I have done so in my *Life of Tolstoy*. What concerns us at present is the influence of his belief on his own life and conduct.

It made him resolve to get rid of his estates, renounce any further copyright in his works, and accept no payment for anything he wrote.

His wish was to hand over his estates to the peasants of Yásnaya Polyána where he lived, but he was balked in this by the strenuous opposition of his wife who rather than see her children deprived of the estates was ready to appeal to the Tsar to have her husband declared incompetent to manage his property. One understands her view of the case: she had eight children, and was bent on maintaining (or if possible improving) the social position the family enjoyed and which she considered to be their due. Be that as it may, the clash of opinion between husband and wife produced very painful results and it was only Tolstoy's firm conviction of the validity of his non-resistant principle that enabled him to withstand the pressure brought to bear on him by his

wife and by the relations and friends who sided with her. He was however resolved, if he might not give his lands to the peasants, at least not to own them himself, and he got his wife and children to divide up his estates in equal portions among themselves and formal transfers were signed accordingly.

Having done that, he wanted to leave home and live in poverty among the peasants, but again his wife strenuously insisted that he must not leave her; and he had to choose between yielding to her demands or arousing anger and bitterness in her as a first step on the path which he had hoped would show the way to goodwill among men. Once again he felt it his duty to yield to his wife, and by so doing incurred much misrepresentation and misunderstanding among those who shared the views he had expressed and wished him to give outward proof of his consistence by abandoning his family and living among the peasants.

What he was able to do, and did do, in the teeth of much ridicule and opposition, was to abandon alcohol and tobacco, to become a strict vegetarian, and to dress in simple clothes like the peasants. All this was opposed by his wife, who ridiculed him in private and before visitors, and made things as unpleasant as possible, hoping to induce him to return to a conventional mode of life.

Early in the eighteen-nineties he wrote the short and simple

stories now collected in the volume of *Twenty-Three Tales*. This he did from a feeling that because he ate the fruit of the peasants' toil it was incumbent on him to provide them with food as wholesome for them mentally as their bread was for him physically.

Whenever it came to publishing anything, however, he met with reproaches and unpleasantness, for he had announced that he would take no payment and that all who cared to were free to publish and republish his writings as they pleased. His wife, who was publishing a collected edition of his works, was most anxious, if she could not have the copyright, to secure at least the first publication of what he wrote. He however wished that no money from his writings should come to his family, and preferred to give such stories as were suitable for the purpose to the *Posrednik*, a benevolent group devoted to publishing and distributing very cheap and wholesome literature for the people in place of the penny-dreadfuls and grossly superstitious church Lives of the Saints as were then usually sold at country fairs, and formed almost the sole literary sustenance of the mass of the population.

This cause of discord recurred continually, and Tolstoy once told me that from the time he renounced copyright the appearance of each new work of his had caused him distress, though previously it had been a pleasure to complete and publish a new

work. Apart from his wife's feeling in the matter, it might fairly be argued that to allow valuable literary property to be scrambled for naturally tends to occasion friction, strife, and ill-will. And in this case a chronic and most bitter strife grew up between the Countess and Tolstoy's chief friend V. G. Chertkov, who had set his heart on obtaining control of Tolstoy's literary output and did eventually secure control of his literary inheritance. So bitter was this strife, and so jealous was the Countess of Chertkov's influence over her husband, that her mind became unbalanced. She developed hysteria, suicidal mania and, the doctor said, paranoia. Be that as it may, though she suffered from delusions on certain subjects she remained quite sane and mentally alert on others. To Tolstoy this strife was so painful that eventually, after some twenty years of it, he found it impossible to remain at Yasnaya Polyana, and escaped secretly one dark winter night with no definite plan of where to go or what to do. After a short visit to his sister he fell ill, and died at the wayside station of Astapovo, little more than a hundred miles from home, a martyr to the rule of conduct he had adopted; and though it may be reasonable to question the validity of some of his opinions, the facts supply conclusive evidence of his complete sincerity and of his readiness to sacrifice all for what he believed to be right.

His posthumous play, *The*

Light Shines in Darkness, gives a vivid and a close description of the conditions of his life at home, and of the suffering he endured there.

The great influence the rule of non-resistance exercised on his life has caused me to leave unmentioned many other religious motives that actuated him, and perhaps some readers may not quite perceive the connection between the rule "Resist not him that is evil" and the obligation Tolstoy felt to abandon his property. His view was that to hold property (literary or other) one has to be ready to defend it personally or by appeal to the law, and personal violence as well as the violence practised by the law, which if resisted leads on to the killing of the resister, are both, *ex hypothesi*, immoral.

In the years 1891-2 Tolstoy devoted himself whole-heartedly to the relief of sufferers in the famine district of Tula and Ryazan provinces, and rendered excellent service both by personally organizing the relief and attracting others to the work, as well as by publishing articles which made known the extent of the famine the government was trying to conceal. But this activity, useful and highly appreciated as it was, left him dissatisfied. He was oppressed by the anomaly of the peasants, who produced the food for everybody, having to be saved from starvation by contributions collected from those who lived by the peasant's toil—saved by "distributing the vomit of the rich" as he phrased it.

A means by which he hoped for the reform of society is indicated in his *Essays on Art*, a work the profundity and validity of which has even yet not been sufficiently realised. It occupied him off and on for fifteen years and was itself the result and the expression of his profoundest beliefs; and he published it knowing well that it would earn him the scorn and denunciation of those addicted to that opiate art which drugs both its producers and its devotees.

AYLMER MAUDE

SEEING THE SELF

To man, the world is a mirror to see the Self, and is hence the subject of his study. The scientist studies it by observation, while the philosopher does it by contemplation, and gets to know the nature of the Self. The man first observes the world around him, then recognises the relation between the sensations and the sense objects, and forms concepts by correspondences (*sankalpa*) and differentiation (*vikalpa*) and thus develops his faculties by analytical thinking. He separates himself from his senses, and listens to the teachings of scriptures (*sravanam*) through the Acharyas regarding the nature of the Self. He then studies these truths and ponders over them by cogitation (*mananam*) and when by mental abstraction and profound contemplation (*nididhyasa*) he grasps the abstract truths through his penetrative intellect, he becomes convinced of the highest truth, the one reality. Even then the scripture says to him "Atma (Paramatma) is not attainable by the study of the Vedas nor by keen intellect etc.; to reach Ishwara there must be the quenchless thirst for Him." Now Ishwara is Sabda-Brahman, the Word-manifest, the Nameless Name. He is transcendental (*nirguna*) but out of pure compassion for us and for the purpose of helping humanity, takes a human form (IX-11). So when after study and deep thinking, the devotee begins to concentrate his mind and fixes it on the image, he goes "from the circumference to the centre" so to say. By means of *nama*, *rupa* and *mantra*, he transcends his mind and gets within, and his centre of gravity is slowly shifted from the head to the heart which now flows towards Bhagawan, as a stream of oil, continuous and unbroken. For, Sri Krishna says in the sixth discourse that when the senses become insensitive, and the mind is serene and quiet, the *antahkarana* which is the bridge between the lower mind (head) and the higher mind (heart) becomes purified, *atman* is seen which is the supreme intelligence (*chaitanya*) and the all-resplendent Light of Ishwara" (VI-20).

PANDIT BHAVANI SHANKAR

RELIGION AS A PERSONAL AFFAIR

[Charles W. Ferguson is the author of *The Confusion of Tongues* and is interested in broadening the religious mind of the race. A few months ago he was busy forming in New York a new publishing house to be devoted exclusively to selected books in the field of religion and ethics. He writes: "We want to present various points of view on matters of general interest, and we shall later have a distinguished editorial council to advise on our policies." —EDS.]

It seems to me odd that a man's faith, which is certainly the most intimate thing he possesses, should be considered the business of anyone but himself. I say this in no spirit of bitterness; nor do I say it as a protest against the increasing encroachment upon privacy which forces all of us to live in glass houses. I am not thinking so much of free speech as I am of free silence. I do not contend that a man should be allowed to say what he believes, but that he ought to be allowed to believe what he wishes without saying anything at all. Religion should be granted some privacy.

These remarks would be more simple-minded than they sound if they did not serve to introduce certain observations I want to make about religion and the future. There is good reason why, up to now, a man's faith has been the property of the community. Historically, religion has been from the days of savagery tied up with social custom. It was an affair of the tribe, later of the state, and is now an affair of the *mores*. As a result, religion has been institutionalized and has demanded, with good reason, conformity and acceptance. A man was a Methodist if he believed in the Thirty-nine Articles of the

Church of England and the sermons of the local pastor. He was a Christian Scientist if he accepted bodily the doctrines and revelations of Mary Baker Eddy. The area of mental reservation left him in either case was highly restricted. It was confined chiefly to fields of slight difference in interpretation; feats of sharp divergence were permitted only between various groups and then only if they were kept within the bounds of dogma and propriety. There consequently grew up and still exists a theory which ostracises not only independence but privacy. The term *free-thinker* thus came to signify a pariah who dwells outside the pale of all religious practices.

The result of all this has been twofold: it has incited proselytising on a world-wide scale and identified religion with missionary zest. In the second place, it has tended to give the negative assertions of apostasy and insurrection an amount of publicity out of all proportion to their deserts.

The missionary zest has taken various forms. It has performed deeds of real sacrifice and accomplished incidental good as well as caused incidental wars. It probably reached its highest pitch in the rural stretches of America, where

roving evangelists descended periodically upon villages and ferreted out with unfailing scent all sinners and rascals, snatching them into the fold of the Lord with threats of hell and promises of happiness and immortality. Its most conspicuous modern expression is undoubtedly to be found in a new cult, known in England as the Oxford Movement and in America both as the First Century Christian Fellowship and as Buchmanism. Its method is to seek and save the lost by insisting upon a smart confession of past errors. In manners, it is an aggressive, bumptious movement which storms with every weapon the citadel of a man's private life. It not only invades a man's private life but also requires that every convert shout abroad the news of his regeneration for the sheer joy of it.

The vast publicity and attention which irreligion and unbelief have received of late are due, of course, to the fact that religion is still looked upon as a community matter. The press delights in attaching high significance to the statement of some nitwit who says he believes less than someone else. This is as pernicious as proselytising. A man who believes differently from his fellows and yet makes a front-page story of it has no sense of religious privacy. He keeps religion in the class with politics, bonds, and social gossip.

It is a hopeful sign, however, that the publicity attending unbelief and lessened belief may

ultimately help toward the goal of religious privacy. The best instance is to be seen in the influence which Modernism left in its wake in America. As a movement, and in spirit and purpose, the modernist effort sought only to reduce the area of the church's supervision over matters of belief and to enlarge the territory of a man's own convictions. In some instances, I confess, the Modernists became rampant and dogmatic. But, in the main, the resentment which the Fundamentalist and Institutionalists felt toward their liberal brethren was due wholly to the fact that the Modernists wanted to make religion a little more private, a little less an affair of the arena and the stage. They were willing, for example, to leave certain honoured doctrines to the judgment of the individual believer. Their dissent met with shouts of treason, but they fairly well established a principle. The era of the salesman in religion is passing and we are building up what is called consumer resistance. This does not mean necessarily that we will become irreligious, but only that we will not be taken in by every campaign organized to make us think and speak one way or the other.

A number of factors have helped to prepare the way for the kingdom of privacy in matters of faith. Not the least of these has been the growing popularity and knowledge in Western countries of Oriental religions and practices. Comparative religion, now widely

taught, has played its part. The Western mind has become hospitable to a knowledge of how people feel and act in other climes; its conceit lessens every time a popular book on world religions is published. Some will deny this. They will argue that such books only serve to heighten the already lofty conceptions Westerners have about their own superiority. This may be the first effect, but it is not the last. The attrition of circumstances wears down our sharpest attitudes. The increase of world intelligence and understanding through travel, reading, even lectures, motion pictures and other minor forms of education will have the ultimate effect of showing us that no creed or culture but only a man's heart contains what is true and final.

It should also be mentioned that the multiplicity of cults and unorthodox sects in America, and to a less extent in England, has softened the severity of established religion toward unconventional belief. This would be difficult to prove. Time was, though, when a person who was a Theosophist or a Christian Scientist or a devotee of the New Thought found himself commonly regarded as queer. But the presence of an increasing number of persons who mind their own business in religion has a decidedly moderating influence on the whole. It is true that orthodox religion has been greatly annoyed by the cults, yet the established churches have been compelled to recognize that the cults are

occupying a field which they, the orthodox, cannot reach. This fact has made the orthodox faiths less certain that they hold the keys to the gates of heaven and hell. If it hasn't done this, it has at least convinced the average man of it, and that is more important.

Obviously, this loosening of institutional morale will vitally affect the religion of the future. It is entirely possible that men and women will continue to accept the church as an institution and perhaps support it, albeit philosophically. Or it may be that a growing number of persons will identify themselves with the unorthodox group which comes nearest to the expression of their beliefs. What is even more likely, I believe, is that men and women will not identify themselves with any church or form of religious organization. Whatever happens, the essential fact of which we may be confident is that religion will become increasingly private, a personal affair between a man and his universe.

Beyond the spread of cultures, there is a further reason why man's religious belief will not in the future be a public matter. Religion will become more difficult to talk about and less difficult to believe. The trend of faith is undoubtedly in the direction of mysticism, in the direction of forms of belief which are fairly incommunicable. That religion will deal with beliefs which are incredible, will help to induce a privacy of faith such as the world has not been blessed with. A clue

to possible developments is afforded by the recrudescence of astrology, numerology, and kindred practices, not to mention the experimental value of Christian Science, Spiritualism, the New Thought and other species of transcendental philosophies. It is a strong temptation to giggle at the excesses and crudities of these forms of belief and miss their ultimate significance in preparing the world for a religion which believes rather than talks. For the excesses and crudities are many. They revolve mostly about the blighting utilitarianism of the Western mind; this is true even when the more mystical types of Oriental faith are imported to the West. The practical bent of the Yankee mind, as I have pointed out in another place, tends to identify religion with magic; the West is hungry for results. But this fact need not obscure the larger fact that the Western mind is, in the strange morass of American and Hindu-American religious cults, searching anxiously for reality. In the course of another fifty years the absorptions which inevitably result from an interchange of cultures will bring Western faith nearer to art and remove it farther and farther from what Americans call the business of getting on.

So we may look forward to a day when a man's vain repetitions in public and his willingness to

testify, to publicize, or to promote a special brand of faith will not be taken as the measuring rod of his religion. We have had far too much exhibitionism in matters of faith. Few of us are able to discuss convincingly our experiences with the unseen. Many of us do not have these experiences frequently and do not wish them. We should not feel obliged to be devout because it is the custom, or to scoff because it attracts attention. I should like to see religion respected for what it is—a private affair. A man ought to keep his beliefs to himself—not out of false pride, not out of modesty, but out of respect for his own personality, out of a realization that every person should have some cherished possession he does not share with the public. I daresay the time will come, assisted by the growth of mysticism, the opening up of the unseen world by science, and the spread of unconventional religious movements, when a man's faith will be something he can no more confess indiscriminately than he could tell casual acquaintances and bell-hops what his bank balance is. However great may be the compulsion of a deep experience, and however impelled we may be to share it, we must realize that we cannot share it by talking about it and that we are likely to make ourselves objectionable if we try.

CHARLES W. FERGUSON

UNTOUCHABLE CLASSES AND THEIR ASSIMILATION IN HINDU SOCIETY

[G. S. Ghurye, Ph. D., Reader in Sociology at the Bombay University, is the author of *Caste and Race in India*.—EDS.]

The classes called untouchables comprise a number of distinct groups, membership in each of which is generally conferred by birth therein. Each one of these groups ordinarily follows a specific occupation, which is traditionally regarded by its members as its proper occupation. Sweeping and scavenging, curing and tanning hides and skins, preparing leather-articles, working in bamboo and cane and weaving coarse cloth are the most prominent amongst them. These various occupations have this feature in common that they are looked upon by other classes of Hindu society as either degrading or polluting. According to the orthodox theory of Hindu social organization these classes form the fifth and the outcast section. They are given the appellation of untouchables because they are believed to impart pollution to members of higher sections if they touch them. But in the orthodox theory on the subject this characteristic of imparting pollution by touch belongs really to the fourth section of the Hindu society. The fifth section—that now called untouchable—is supposed, both in theory and practice, to pollute members of other sections even if they stand at a certain distance. Thus it will be realised that the so-called untouchables are, in prac-

tice, really unapproachables. It is this unapproachability that creates the main difficulties in the path of their assimilation in the Hindu society. The groups comprising this large section in any linguistic region commonly look upon one another also as untouchable.

The fact that the untouchables form in the orthodox theory the fifth section of Hindu society, and also the tendency of the groups comprising this section to regard one another as untouchable, reveals an aspect of the problem of untouchability, which all interested in its solution must clearly realize in order to appreciate fully its gravity. It is nothing else than the inherent connection that exists between the spirit of caste and untouchability, which must properly be considered as only a flagrant manifestation of the spirit of caste. The principle, which runs through the whole caste system, breathes the spirit of exclusiveness, lays down barriers between group and group and culminates in the imposition of various social and religious disabilities on the lower sections. Viewed thus, untouchability registers the highest degree of the spirit of caste. Removal of untouchability, therefore, intimately depends on the disappearance of the spirit of caste. That the diminution of the caste spirit is an essential factor in the cam-

paing against untouchability is a view which cannot be too often repeated or too much emphasized.

Incidents from actual life illustrate this close connection of untouchability with caste-spirit. The tea-party given to the Hon. Minister for Education of the Government of Bombay by the primary teachers of Nasik, and the distinction made in the seating accommodation of teachers belonging to untouchable classes, with its sequel is too recent to need complete narration. What is not clearly perceived is that the distinction tried to be observed in that tea-party between members of the untouchable section and those of other sections, is only a public manifestation of similar treatment offered, and many times accepted with chagrin or inward resentment, in orthodox Brahmin homes and institutions managed by Brahmins, to highly educated and well-situated members of castes which are traditionally believed to be next to the Brahmins in social precedence. The present writer and two of his friends had the privilege of being given this differential treatment in an institution managed by orthodox Brahmins. At dinner they were seated in a row by themselves and away from the row formed by the Brahmin members of the institution. Another friend had similar experience in the home of a Brahmin friend of his, where his seat was cleverly arranged so as to be at right angles to his host's own seat. The only difference

in these cases is that the treatment given by Brahmins to members of the next lower castes at dinner was meted out to members of the untouchable section at tea, which is an occasion considered to require less sanctimonious care. Refusal to treat members of the so-called untouchable section on terms of equality by members of other sections, even when belonging to the same profession and having a more or less similar economic status, is thus only a flagrant manifestation of the mental attitude that animates the caste system.

The untouchable classes as a whole are differentiated from the other sections of Hindu society in various ways. The orthodox members of the other sections—and they form the bulk—look upon them with dislike and even contempt and regard them as incapable of a more healthy, cleanly and moral life. They spurn to have any dealings with them, which savour of anything like social intercourse. Their children are generally shunned in common schools and so segregated that it is nearer practical truth to say that they do not get admission into these schools. The untouchable classes generally find great difficulty in getting an ample supply of fresh water, because where separate wells for their use do not exist—and they are I presume few and far between—there is always great trouble in getting water from the common wells, even when they are public.

The untouchables are not al-

lowed to enter the precincts of Hindu temples; nor are they served by regular priests. Thus they cannot practise the religion they believe in. They are further prevented from taking advantage of the only method the Hindus have devised for imparting discourses on the proper ideals of life, on the Hindu ideas of cleanliness and morality, viz. the *Bhajans*, *Kirtans* and *Pravachans* that are conducted in the temples. Thus we have the sorry spectacle of a large section of the population utterly depressed and stagnant.*

The problem is, therefore, four-fold. First, there is the immediate need of removing the disabilities that actually hamper the development of the individual by acting as hindrances in the way of better and cleaner living. Second, to enable these classes to appreciate a cleaner and more moral mode of life. Third, to accustom the members of other sections to a freer social intercourse with these people. And lastly, to undermine and eradicate the exclusivist spirit of caste.

For this purpose the Central organization to fight untouchability must have a net of smaller committees all over the country. There must be the Provincial committees. Every Provincial committee should appoint a small number of persons, who are sympathetic and who sign a

pledge that they will work for the removal of untouchability, at least in every Taluq-town, to carry on the programme outlined by the Central organization. The Taluq-town committee should be entrusted with the work of looking into any alleged grievance of the untouchables in their own town and whenever possible in the villages of their Taluq.† Cases of bad treatment of untouchables or of refusal to admit their children to common schools, differential treatment in Government or Municipal Dispensaries are some of the grievances which this committee should try amicably to settle by private and personal negotiation and persuasion. Failing such polite remedies, the committee should communicate with the civil authorities of the place and also inform the Provincial committee about the incidents. The Provincial committee may then decide upon legal action or may confer with the higher civil authorities. Every single case of grievance should thus be taken due notice of and such organized attempts be made to remedy it.

Wherever the untouchable classes find it impossible or very difficult to get an ample supply of fresh water the Taluq-town committee, after careful investigation, should be authorized to get wells sunk at suitable places at the expense of the Provincial committee. Access to the Hindu

* I think that there are a number of other castes wholly or partially engaged in agriculture, to which these remarks will also apply, excepting that they are not considered untouchable.

† The Taluq is a subdivision of a district.

temples is quite essential, but if the trustees of some of the temples find it impossible owing to some legal difficulty to throw open the temples under their charge to the untouchables, we need not waste our energy over such temples but leave them out for the present and ask the Taluq committee to concentrate their efforts on all those temples which are not bound by such legal restrictions. We must try to see the various items in the campaign against untouchability in their proper perspective and not exaggerate the importance of temple entry so as to divert our attention from other items. Free access to Hindu temples is only one of the rights to be won as a result of the admission by the orthodox section of the social equality of these classes, and it is not the most important means for the assimilation of these classes in the Hindu society. Other measures are far more important, and it should be our objective to realize them in practice as soon as possible. In the meantime persons, specially trained for the purpose, must be employed to create public opinion among the untouchable classes for cleaner and more moral living, the essentials of which may have to be conveyed to them through the medium of stories about Hindu epic characters and saints.

Institutions, imparting mixed instruction in the vernacular curriculum, in the English language and in technical arts and crafts such as are useful in the mofussil and even in the cities, to pupils, who have

finished their fourth standard of the vernacular course leading them, through a training for four years, either to the vernacular final examination or to the examination for entrance to the English High school and to certificate-examination in at least one of the technical arts and crafts—are a crying educational need of this country. Arguments in favour of such an educational development need not be entered into here. From the viewpoint of the present problem, my main contention is that when such schools or departments are established they must have full equipment for imparting scientific training in all such crafts as have been the traditional occupations of the untouchable classes. Such training will offer an object lesson in the art of personal cleanliness even under the special conditions of these occupations and may help these classes, if they avail themselves of it, to enhance their earning capacity. The other sections of the Hindu society will realize that these occupations can be carried on by all without attaching to them their traditional ideas of impurity.

Lastly, in order to help the scavenging section of these classes to become cleanly the Provincial committee should try to persuade all units of Local Self-government, which employ them, to devise ways and means so as to enable them to carry on their work without bringing their bodies in direct contact with the dirty material that has to be handled.

Simultaneously with these ef-

forts we have to prepare the minds of the populace at large to look upon untouchability as both undesirable and impracticable. To achieve this twofold object we must start an intensive propaganda preaching against untouchability. While doing this we must not be drawn into a controversy over the existence or non-existence of the doctrine of untouchability in the Hindu Dharma Shastras. We should take up the rationalist and social attitude and argue that whatever the Shastras may say on this matter modern conditions of life and doctrines of morality make untouchability both impracticable and undesirable.

Side by side with this lecturing propaganda the Provincial committee and the Taluq-committees must enlist the co-operation of the Government and local governing units to put into practice another part of the programme, which, I consider, will have the desired effect of accustoming the public to social intercourse with the so-called untouchables. In this connection it is well to remember that power and authority, however lowly, does count and that people are not ready to hurt those in authority light-heartedly. Most people have much to do with certain public offices and local government organizations. They have, without much choice, to negotiate with persons who are employed in such offices and institutions towards whom their attitude is generally one of awe. I submit that if members of the untouchable classes are

employed in such offices in every Taluq-town, the town people, however orthodox they may be, will perforce have to enter into some social intercourse with them. Such constant intercourse in semi-public activities is bound to affect the basic attitude towards untouchability. By practice all the edge of sharpness will wear out.

Educative propaganda carried on simultaneously with this programme for accustoming the people to social intercourse with the untouchables in semi-public life, will strengthen the practice into an attitude of mind ready to ignore all public manifestation of the doctrine of this age-long principle. It is with this purpose in view that I suggest that efforts should be immediately made to employ at least one or two policemen, one postman, at least one peon, each, in the offices of the Mamlatdar, the sub-Judge and the sub-Registrar in every Taluq-town preferably from among the members of the untouchable classes resident in the particular Taluq. It should also be our aim to employ them as clerks in these offices as well as in the office of the town municipality, as soon as qualified persons are available. The leaders of the untouchable classes should persuade such persons with minimum qualifications to accept clerkship in such town-offices rather than seek service in the Secretariat or other City offices. The effect of such persons being employed in the town-offices on the status and prestige of these classes would be

far greater than their rise to even higher posts in the cities, where anti-untouchability propaganda does not need to be so intensive.

Last, but the most important in the long run, is that aspect of the problem which is inherently connected with the spirit of caste. If we succeed in the all-sided attack outlined above we shall be able to see that the flagrant and public manifestation of the doctrine of untouchability ceases. But the people, who are imbued with the spirit of caste—which requires for its satisfaction hierarchical arrangement of groups with its attendant differentia of higher and lower status—will put into practice the ready advice of double standard of treatment. While tolerating some sort of social intercourse with the erstwhile untouchables in public and semi-public activities of life, orthodox people will try to avoid all such situations where they have to treat these people as their equals in some of the more intimate aspects of social intercourse. The attempt at differential seating accommodation in a public tea-party will not be made but care will be taken to see that such mixed

tea-parties are if possible not arranged or, if arranged, individuals will find excuses not to attend the same. We may not expect the untouchables of to-day to be invited to social functions by members of higher castes. Nor will the members of higher castes freely attend social functions in the homes of the members of the present untouchable classes. Surely this is not what we want. Such treatment of a group does not constitute its assimilation into the Hindu society. For such assimilation the exclusivist spirit of caste, which revels in some sort of differentiation between group and group and necessitates the recognition of some group as the lowest in the hierarchy, must be eradicated. I have dealt with the proper method of achieving this end in my book *Caste and Race in India* and do not propose to repeat here what I have already said. I should sound a note of warning that as long as this spirit of caste is abroad the present-day untouchables will remain the lowest group of Hindu society, somehow differentiated from others, and complete assimilation will not be achieved.

G. S. GHURYE

जन्मना जायते शूद्रः संस्काराद्विज उच्यते ।

By birth every one is a shudra ;
by samskara (self-refinement) he
becomes twice-born.

D. H. LAWRENCE THE MAN OF KAMA-MANAS

[J. D. Beresford gives a Theosophical reading of the strange case of D. H. Lawrence, in some ways reminiscent of that other strange case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Last month we published a review of Lawrence's Letters by Geoffrey West.—EDS.]

The character and writings of D. H. Lawrence were so individual, so markedly different in certain particulars from those of his intellectual equals and contemporaries, that it is inevitable we should find a very wide divergence of opinion concerning him after his death. We are asked to choose between such absurd extremes as are suggested by a comparison with Christ on the one hand and on the other his dismissal as a depraved writer of pornographic novels. In a recent (Oct. 1932) broadcast recommendation to read his lately published Letters, the speaker, a person of standing and authority in the literary world, said that Lawrence had "a truly noble mind". Mr. Huxley in his deeply interesting Preface to these Letters gives us much material for thought, but although he insists that Lawrence was an "Artist," (a term that by some minds is held to account for any peculiarity), he does not commit himself to any definite pronouncement on his moral quality. Wherefore, with all this material before us, it may interest readers of THE ARYAN PATH to attempt some account of Lawrence as judged by a theosophical standard.

In the first place it is essential to state quite definitely that Lawrence was not a loose liver. His single devotion to a woman was given to her who was afterwards his wife, a woman some years older than himself,—in which connection it is interesting to remember that he followed the example of another man of genius, also a consumptive, R. L. Stevenson. Lawrence in fact, was not a lustful man. His novels, and one at least of his letters, demonstrate his extraordinary preoccupation with sex, but it was an intellectual and in some sense a psychic rather than a physical preoccupation.

In the second place we must take account of his attitude towards humanity. In his personal relations, I found him a gentle, kindly man. He had moments of anger when opposed. I have seen his wife in tears as the result of an unforgiveably insulting injunction to silence given in a company of ten people. Nevertheless, he had a great gift of understanding and sympathy for the troubles of his friends and even of his acquaintances. Yet in his letters he appears as a fierce hater of humanity as a whole and decides that Christianity is "based on the love of self, the love of property, one degree removed," that

it is "insufficient in me. I too believe that a man must fight." That attitude became an obsession with him in the course of the war. In two letters to myself not included in those here published, he wrote that he could not "face his hated fellow men," and that he wished the whole world would "go off like a bomb in space," because "we could not live and leave all these filthy vermin rampant".

Lastly, in this connection, we must accord him the virtue of courage. No man was ever less a time server. Although he was often at his wits' end for money, he wrote always not as if he would have a million men for audience, in Goethe's phrase, but solely to satisfy his own desire.

It is natural enough that in such a queer case, apparently full of irreconcilable qualities, so many diverse judgments should have been passed upon him; but the difficulties may disappear under a theosophical explanation of his being. For to me it seems almost certain that he was a very young soul, and that his animal centres dominated his unusually fine brain. When I say "Animal," however, the description conveys no intention of grossness. It was with the horse that he had a secret affinity. There is a very remarkable letter of more than three pages in this volume, given to an exultant identification of himself with the centaur, a metaphor that could not be bettered. "Oh! Horse, Horse, Horse," he writes, "when you kick your heels you shatter an

enclosure every time. And over here," (he writes for London), "the horse is dead I don't know whether it's the pale Galilean who has triumphed, or a paleness paler than the pallor even of Jesus"; and later: "But talking seriously, man must be Centaur. This two-legged forked radish is going flabby." Mr. Huxley writes that Lawrence "could get inside the skin of an animal and tell you in the most convincing detail how it felt and how dimly, inhumanly it thought". "He sees," Vernon Lee is reported to have said in the same connection, "more than a human being ought to see. Perhaps that's why he hates humanity so much." But, to me, the most convincing piece of self-revelation is in a letter from New Mexico, dated 1922, in which he shews himself as fiercely angry with an obscene book that had been sent to him. And all the force of his strictures is directed against those who have "got their sex in their head". "Why," he asks "don't you Jeunesse let all the pus of festering sex out of your heads, and try to act from the original centres?" That, indeed, was his own problem, and he did not know it, which was why he so furiously resented the recognition of it in another. He was continually decrying intellectuality, even his own. "I don't feel it here," he says to Mr. Huxley, and lays his hands on his midriff.

I have no space to press the analogy further, but it seems probable that in Lawrence's case

there was an unusual reaction between the Manas and the Kamarupa, by which the animal desires and passions found expression through the mind rather than through the body, despising their medium in the act. The inference we must draw is that D. H.

Lawrence had not and could not have any spiritual message for his generation. He may have been a poet and a man of genius by literary standards, but he had no remedy for the world's suffering nor for his own.

J. D. BERESFORD

SELF-SHINING

"The One Self shines in all but not in all does it shine forth equally."

The flame of Spirit burns within each, steady and clear, whether the lamp be clay or chrysoprass, but how far it can rout the outer gloom depends upon the personality in which it shines.

Soul growth and unfoldment are in terms of the thinning of the veil between the Spirit in any man and a world in desperate need of its light.

The rank materialist offers an impassable barrier to the divine ray which shines into him. The consciousness wholly concerned with things of earth, pleasures of sense and laying up of wealth, is like an opaque globe which no gleam from within can penetrate.

The personality or mask of the ordinary man is more or less translucent. Fitful gleams bear inter-

mittent witness to the fire that glows within, but mounting passions and selfish thoughts, sweeping across the soul, now and again becloud the radiance, as storm-clouds hide the sun.

Only the personality which has yielded itself utterly to the Divine, the lower nature which has become but the passive instrument for the higher, offers no obstacle to the immaculate light. The transparent purity of the Perfected Soul serves but to guard the flame of gold from every passing gust. It cannot veil the lambent glory of the Self of All, which pours its radiance forth undimmed, as through clear alabaster, to flood the Path with light for pilgrim feet.

E. H.

I.—PERSONAL EXPERIENCES

[C. E. M. Joad is a realist and a rationalist and for that reason alone, if not for others, the straightforward record of his abnormal experiences becomes valuable. Elsewhere (p. 121) we publish a review by Mr. J. W. N. Sullivan of Mr. Joad's *Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science*, and we may suggest that readers refresh their memory by perusing that review as to the type of thinker who is the recorder of the following experiences. We invited Mr. Joad to record his own abnormal experiences in the hope that the attention of thinking men may be drawn to the study of the laws underlying these phenomena. Appropriately we may quote the instruction of one of the Great Masters of Theosophy on the relationship of phenomena to philosophy :—

Try to break thro' that great *maya* against which occult students, the world over, have always been warned by their teachers—the hankering after phenomena. Like the thirst for drink and opium, it grows with gratification. The Spiritualists are drunken with it; they are thaumaturgic sots. If you cannot be happy without phenomena you will never learn our philosophy. If you want healthy, philosophic thought, and can be satisfied with such—let us correspond. I tell you a profound truth in saying that if you (like your fabled Shloma) but choose wisdom all other things will be added unto it—in time. It adds no force to our metaphysical truths that our letters are dropped from space on to your lap or come under your pillow. If our philosophy is wrong a *wonder* will not set it right. Put that conviction into your consciousness and let us talk like sensible men. Why should we play with Jack-in-the-box; are not our beards grown?

It is he alone who has the love of humanity at heart, who is capable of grasping thoroughly the idea of a regenerating practical Brotherhood who is entitled to the possession of our secrets. He alone, such a man—will never misuse his powers, as there will be no fear that he should turn them to selfish ends. A man who places not the good of mankind above his own good is not worthy of becoming our *chela*—he is not worthy of becoming higher in knowledge than his neighbour. If he craves for phenomena let him be satisfied with the pranks of spiritualism. —EDS.]

The Editors of THE ARYAN PATH have asked me to describe my experiences of psychical or, as I should prefer to call them, supernormal phenomena. This article contains a brief account of some of the most noteworthy. In a subsequent article I shall venture to offer certain tentative explanations, explanations which, in the present state of our knowledge, can only be regarded in the light

of hypotheses, of the phenomena described.

One or two preliminary observations may serve to indicate the nature of my interest in and attitude to the subject as a whole. My approach is scientific rather than religious or philosophical. I am not convinced of personal survival, and I think it on the whole unlikely that the phenomena studied by psychical research are

caused by the communicating spirits of those who are normally called dead. I do not wish to deny this hypothesis, but I do not think that it is established, and it seems to me to be antecedently improbable. For this reason my interest in the subject is not inspired by a desire to get into touch with the surviving spirits of those to whom I was attached in life, to obtain evidence for the immortality of the soul, or of the fundamentally spiritual character of the universe. On the other hand, I do not believe, as do many, that the phenomena in question are all faked, and I do not therefore regard the literature of the subject as a testimony to nothing but the quackery of mediums and the dupery of sitters. I hold, on the contrary, that many of the phenomena are genuine and that, although the mode of their causation is unknown, they are probably to be attributed to the existence of little known and rarely developed powers of the human mind and body, powers which occultists in all countries and ages have drawn upon and invoked. As a psychologist I am intensely interested in the existence and nature of these powers, and hold that they should be investigated by the methods of observation and experiment which have proved successful in the sciences. Thus psychical research is for me primarily a branch of science.

I do not, however, believe that any explanation in terms of little known human faculties and powers would be exhaustive; in

fact, I believe that no single explanation covers or is likely to cover all the ground, in the sense of applying to all the heterogeneous phenomena which are roughly classed together as psychical.

I begin with phenomena which have struck me because of their triviality. By calling them trivial I wish to imply a repudiation of the view that the phenomena in question convey some special and secret knowledge which enlarges our understanding of the universe, that they are in some important sense "significant". Nevertheless they are, I hold, totally unexplained. Moreover this character of triviality which attaches to so many phenomena points, in my view, strongly in the direction of their genuineness. There is a motive for faking messages, consolation for the bereaved, money for the faker; there is an incentive to the expert illusionist to produce sensational effects with disappearing bodies, materialising and dematerialising limbs and so forth. But who would dream of investing with significance jumping coins, tugs at children's hair, broken crockery, overturned jugs of water and those other phenomena commonly attributed to poltergeists or earth spirits?

The most remarkable set of these phenomena I have witnessed occurred in connection with Eleanor Zugun, a Rumanian peasant girl, who visited London some years ago for observation by the National Laboratory of Psychical Research. Eleanor, who

was about twelve or thirteen years old, possessed the undeveloped mentality of a child of seven or eight, and believed herself to be possessed by the devil. Evidence of possession was of two kinds. Teeth marks, scratches and weals would suddenly appear upon her face and arms without visible agency, and small objects in Eleanor's neighbourhood would alter their position, fly through the air, disappear. The former were attributed to bitings and scratchings by "Draco," the latter to his invisible powers. Both types of phenomena occurred quite frequently while Eleanor was in London. The girl would sit on the floor of the Laboratory in broad daylight playing with her toys; the observers would sit about and converse, waiting for something to happen. Small metal objects, marked coins and so forth, would appear unexpectedly in people's pockets, in the drawers of desks, on a high ledge which ran round the wall of the room just below the ceiling. This ledge was bounded on the room side by a raised rim of wood—it was used for picture and curtain hanging—and nothing placed on it could by normal means fall off. Nevertheless marked coins did continually fall off, projecting themselves visibly into the middle of the room.

A friend of mine had a curious experience. Going to say good-bye to Eleanor on the last day of her visit, he found himself unable to approach her owing to the crowd of visitors. He waved to her

across the room, and after staying for a few minutes, left to catch a train. In the train he began to read a newly published book, and, finding the pages uncut, searched in his pocket for his knife. The feel of the knife seemed to him unusual and on examination it was found to be encircled with a band of metal, a metal letter C, so tightly that a hammer and chisel were required to remove it. My friend had no explanation to offer, unless this too was the work of Draco.

My interest in the whole subject was first aroused by a series of so-called messages, which were invested with just that atmosphere of trivial irrelevance of which I have spoken, qualified in one or two instances by the barest suggestion of definite and purposive malice. I give in detail one of these latter cases, since it profoundly influenced me at the time.

As an Oxford undergraduate I spent one long summer vacation with four other men on an island off the coast of Brittany. Every evening we used to experiment with the tumbler. For the benefit of those who have not yet amused themselves in this way, I should explain that the letters of the alphabet are arranged in a circle on the top of a table or some other smooth surface. An upturned tumbler or wineglass is placed in the centre of the circle, and the "sitters" put their fingers on the bottom of the glass. In a minute or two the glass will begin to move, sometimes with great rapi-

dity, over the table top, and will touch various letters. Sometimes the letters will form words which, if you are so minded, you may interpret as messages from the "spirits".

Having practised the "tumbler" every evening for five weeks we were anxious to obtain a piece of information which could not conceivably have been within the knowledge of some one or other of those present. We were determined, if we could, to rule out the "unconscious" hypothesis as an explanation of our messages. There is always a temptation to turn "spirit" information to one's own advantage, and presently somebody thought of racing "tips". We had none of us the remotest connection with the racing world, but somebody did happen to know that there was a race known as the Cesarewitch, although we could not have said where or when it was run. Accordingly we asked the tumbler for the name of the horse which would win the Cesarewitch, and immediately it spelled out the word "Romola".

Several months elapsed, and I had forgotten all about the tumbler and its message, when one morning I received a letter from one of the men asking if I had seen the names of the horses running in the Cesarewitch. I looked up the list in the paper and was thrilled to find that one of the horses was called Romola. Considerably excited, all the tumbler users laid bets on the horse, in one case to a considerable amount. The beast was scratched three

days before the race. The impression I received from this example was exactly that of some rather elementary intelligence taking a mischievous delight in discomfiting those who ventured to pry into mysteries, an impression which has since been confirmed.

Coming to the more orthodox occurrences of the séance room, I have been most impressed by the phenomenon known as ectoplasm. I have seen this only once and in that dim, red light which all professional mediums seem to regard as essential to the manifestation of phenomena, on the ground that in ordinary daylight the spirit "control" is disabled from producing effects. This red light, it is important to note, is exceedingly unfavourable to accurate observation. The rays which are at the lower end of the light spectrum tend to deprive the eye of the power of accurate definition. It is not so much that objects appear blurred and indistinct; on the contrary one believes oneself to be seeing them clearly and precisely, when in fact one has lost the power to discriminate detail: and, unless this fact is known to and kept constantly in mind by the observer, he will be under the illusion that, when he has made allowance for the dimness of the light, he is seeing almost as well as he does in light of ordinary wave length.

Ectoplasm, it should be explained, is a white pulpy substance of the consistency of congealed porridge, which obtrudes itself from under the cabinet or from

between the curtains behind which the medium is sitting, undulates and bellies about the room, almost as if it were alive, and is said on occasion to form itself into definite shapes. The official theory is that it is the stuff of the medium's body temporarily dematerialised, and used by spirit agencies, the medium's control or controls, to act upon physical objects on which it produces visible effects such as change of position. I witnessed this phenomenon by the courtesy of the late M. Geley, Director of the International Metapsychical Institute in Paris, the medium being the celebrated Eva C. The ectoplasm appeared as a gelatinous drab white substance—to the touch it was rather like the white of a hard boiled egg—and, as far as I could see, it issued from the nostrils and mouth of the medium. The photographs at the end of M. Geley's book, *From the Unconscious to the Conscious*, give a good idea of the phenomenon. It was said that at the Eva C. séances the ectoplasm frequently formed itself into the shape of a woman's face; but I did not myself see this. I understand that the genuineness of these experiments has since been challenged, but owing to the lack of strict control in the séance room, I am quite unable to say whether the phenomena were genuine or not.

The most fruitful medium with whom I have sat is Rudi Schneider, who has been fairly continually under investigation in

England during recent years at the National Laboratory of Psychical Research, under the directorship of Mr. Harry Price. By the courtesy of Mr. Price I have attended a number of sittings with this medium, and, although the phenomena are produced, in the usual dim red light, I can vouch for the fact that the medium is rigidly controlled, his hands and arms being held by members of the circle, who have also placed their feet upon his. Moreover, flashlight photographs of the phenomena, effected by means of electrical current, have shown them to be taking place at a distance of several yards from the medium. A full account of the phenomena will be found in Mr. Price's book *Rudi Schneider*.

Under these conditions I have seen luminous objects placed in a closed cage move and jump, tambourines and rattles play, tables move across the floor, curtains sway and belly out into the room, luminous waste paper baskets leave the ground and fly through the air; and on one memorable occasion, the medium's control, "Olga," having first warned us in a hoarse whisper—using apparently the medium's vocal chords—to sit up and take notice of what she hoped would be a hitherto unprecedented effect, I saw a handkerchief lift itself from a table, tear itself in mid-air, and then tie one end of itself into a knot. At all these séances a thermometer chart showed a marked lowering of the temperature of the room during

the séance, a remarkable fact when one reflects upon the usual effects of six or seven people sitting in a small closed room for two or three hours.

What do these apparently trivial occurrences prove? In my view, nothing that we can affirm with certainty; certainly not that the human soul is immortal or even that it survives bodily death. At the same time I believe them to be genuine, to belong to the same type as the effects traditionally produced by occultists and seers, and to stand in urgent need of explanation.

I have said nothing about psychological as opposed to physical phenomena, for the reason that I have never witnessed or experienced any that seemed to me to possess significance. By psychological phenomena I mean messages purporting to come from the surviving spirits of dead persons and telepathic and similar communications. As regards the first, I have been present when such messages have been received, but no one of them has ever contained

detailed or definite information which could not conceivably have been available to the medium or the sitters. For the most part they have been couched in the language of moral uplift, and conveyed vague and platitudinous sentiments which are the stock in trade of all the ethical codes and religious systems. Moreover, messages purporting to come from the surviving spirits of intelligent men have betrayed only the sentiments, beliefs and general ideological outlook of the age, country and social class of the medium, so that I have been driven to the conclusion that if the souls of great men survive, their brains do not. As regards telepathic powers, I in common with most Westerners have lived a busy life of action and intellectual effort; I have neither time to meditate, nor inclination to sit still and listen. Consequently my subliminal self which is regarded as the source and repository of these powers, has had little chance to outcrop and my experiences have been negligible.

C. E. M. JOAD

Those who devote themselves to the gods go to the gods; the worshippers of the pitris go to the pitris; those who worship bhutas (ghosts or the so called spirits of the dead) go to them, and my worshippers come to me.

BHAGAVAD-GITA, IX, 25

CHRISTIAN IMMORTALITY AND HINDU REINCARNATION

[M. A. Venkata Rao, M. A., is a lecturer in logic and philosophy at Mysore University.

H. P. Blavatsky writes (*Glossary*) that Reincarnation "is derided by some, rejected by others, called absurd and inconsistent by the third: yet it is the oldest and the most universally accepted belief from an immemorial antiquity. And if this belief was universally accepted by the most subtle philosophical minds of the pre-Christian world, surely it is not amiss that some of our modern intellectual men should also believe in it, or at least give the doctrine the benefit of the doubt. Even the Bible hints at it more than once, St. John the Baptist being regarded as the reincarnation of Elijah, and the Disciples asking whether the blind man *was born blind because of his sins*, which is equal to saying that he had *lived and sinned before being born blind*." Attention of those interested may be drawn to U. L. T. Pamphlet No. 8 which contains (1) "Reincarnation in Judaism and the Bible," (2) "Reincarnation in the Bible," and (3) "Christian Fathers on Reincarnation," by W. Q. Judge.—Eds.]

McTaggart and James Ward are the only prominent philosophers in the West who favour the hypothesis of rebirth. Prof. Pringle-Pattison thinks it worth discussing, though he concludes in favour of immortality. Prof. A. E. Taylor expresses surprise that a philosopher of the distinction of Dr. McTaggart should afford it the dignity of a serious discussion. Adopting the words of Kant Dr. James Ward characterises this attitude of speculative philosophers of the West with regard to the doctrine of rebirth as an "arrogance of negation". (*Realm of Ends*, p. 404, 2nd ed.) Both rebirth and immortality, perhaps, stand on the same footing so far as scientific proof is concerned, but Karma is more comprehensive and includes the truth of immortality in a form more congruent with the scientific view of the universe as a system of self-acting law.

Immortality as a doctrine of

Christian theology implies the survival of the soul after death. But as mere survival has no moral value, Christian theologians postulate not merely eternal duration but eternal fellowship with God. The theory implies (1) the arbitrary creation of souls for the present embodiment, (2) the final determination of the soul's destiny on the basis of one life, (3) and a total transformation of its nature at and after death. Theology tries to mitigate the difficulty of each of these assumptions separately, without revising the common basis, which would show the reasonableness of the rebirth hypothesis.

(1) To assume that souls are created "out of nothing" at the moment of birth is open to all the objections of the "*tabula rasa*" theory of mind. Souls present remarkable differences of endowment. Environment is powerless to account for them. If heredity is appealed to, we will

have further to assume that the work of creation respects the laws of heredity and proceeds in harmony with the laws of the physical universe. If that is so, the origination of each soul involves a separate miracle, an irruption of an extra-rational power into the scheme of things.

Another objection against this view is the unthinkable extent to which the universe will become populated with souls, if each birth connotes a separate soul. "We must remember that the universe is incapable of increase. And to suppose a supply of new souls, none of which ever perished, would clearly land us in an insoluble difficulty." (F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 502.) To dismiss this difficulty lightly with Pringle-Pattison as merely a species of spiritual Malthusianism is not to furnish a solution.

(2) The view of one earthly life succeeded by endless continuance is most defective from the moral standpoint. Moral perfection is a demand that cannot be fulfilled in the course of one life. As Kant put it, perfect holiness of life is unattainable in this life. The Kantian postulate implies a profound insight into the infinite riches of the soul. Man's life is a tension between infinite potentiality and finite opportunity. That is why Carlyle's cowboy will not be satisfied with half the universe. That is why no *one* of the goods of life, beauty, truth, happiness, can satisfy if rendered absolute and exclusive. Further,

the spiritual life is a continuous ascent, involving infinite acts of will in endless situations. No one act is decisive. The future is always free even if the past is beyond recall. To say that final judgment is passed on the basis of one life is to condemn the soul just when it has opened its eyes to its powers. Since the moral enterprise is bound to be incomplete at death the vast majority of souls must be condemned to eternal frustration. Rebirth opens up a vaster vista and reveals the soul midway in an infinite process of realisation, gradually rising on the stepping stones of its dead selves to an immortal destiny.

(3) The idea of such immortality necessitates a total transformation of the conditions of existence at death. The soul is freed from embodiment and is sent to heaven or hell by the mere fact of death, or, on the Catholic hypothesis, it is retained in purgatory till rendered "fit for grace". A separate purgatory renders the present life unmoral; but if purgatory is a continuation of the moral struggle, it may very well be located in the field of realisation we know. Human life may be a purgatorial process, the earth a vale of soul-making.

I cannot conceive that most of us with our narrow range of understanding and sympathies, our senseless antipathies and indifferences, and our conventional moral outlook, could ever be fitted by the mere fact of escape from the physical limitations of the body to enter at once into the life of the simply loving souls the process of purgation begun in this life in all who have made

any progress in good, needs for all but the very few, to be continued and intensified, and . . . for most of us, this means severe discipline. (A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, I, p. 317)

Here is the reluctant evidence of Professor Taylor in favour of a plurality of lives. He does not draw this natural conclusion, but supposes that even in heaven the process of realisation will continue.

. . . We may reasonably anticipate that the law of dying into life holds good for heaven itself as well as for earth and purgatory. (*Ibid.*, p. 321)

This only means that heaven begins here and is a quality of the soul; and if the very few appear to need no purgation, they may very well have gone through it in earlier lives. Pringle-Pattison's solution of the difficulty cuts the Gordian knot and is a remedy worse than the disease. He argues for conditional immortality. Immortality is a matter of achievement; the unfit will be remorselessly weeded out. But this is a selection more drastic than the biological. Souls are created only to be destroyed. Such a crude remedy is unnecessary; on the hypothesis of rebirth, souls have endless chances both for improvement and for counter-acting the past.

The hypothesis of rebirth is free from these difficulties, and includes the elements of truth contained in the idea of immortality. The destiny of the soul is the same on both views: eternal fellowship with Deity or *Sadhana*. The Christian tradition concentrates all human values into the present life and decides the eternal fate

of the soul on the basis of one life. The Eastern tradition has a deeper appreciation of the magnitude of the process and demands eternal life for its fulfilment. But instead of awkwardly putting one little earthly life of three score years and ten in juxtaposition with eternal life after death, it envisages a plurality of lives for the same soul from "everlasting to everlasting". Man's soul becomes coeval with manifestation. The speculative difficulties of a temporal creation are avoided. Eternal life is thought of as the inspiring ground of the time process, instead of mere perpetuity after death. God is rendered congruent with the universe. He becomes a sharer in the life and destiny of souls from within. All problems of predestination and grace disappear. Grace is achieved in acts of right willing; every soul is in perpetual contact with the divine life. *Samsara* is a process of entering deeply into the life of the Spirit. No souls are lost beyond redemption. Eternal death is not offered as the wages of finite sin. Prof. A. G. Hogg's criticism that the hypothesis of karma and rebirth has no connection with grace and redemption cannot be accepted. In the Hindu view of life, *Samsara* is an educative process which necessarily leads to salvation. The journey is either long or short, pleasant or unpleasant in accordance with the will of the individual. In fact degrees of salvation are recognised. As the soul explores the depth and breadth in the life of the Spirit, it

enters into and appropriates more and more of the immanent life of Deity. The first stage is *Samipya* (समीप्य) or nearness to God, i.e., entry into the kingdom, getting a hold on the eternal values; the next is *Sarupya* (सारूप्य), i.e., of the same form or nature as God. Finally *Sayujya* (सायुज्य) becoming one with God, or absorption in Him. All these stages are stages of activity, of realisation, though there are differences of interpretation with regard to the last.

Rebirth is denied consideration on certain familiar grounds:—

(1) The most common objection is lack of memory. If we had a past life we should remember it. But certain people do claim to remember the incidents of their earlier embodiments. This is a matter for patient investigation and not dogmatic denial. Further, memory is not essential to growth, forgetting does not necessarily mean dropping from consciousness. Dispositions, *Vasanas* in Hindu phraseology, remain. Just as psycho-analysis claims by a special process to revive memories buried in the unconscious, it may be possible for souls at a high stage of evolution to remember all their experiences acquired at earlier stages.

(2) Prof. Taylor objects to reincarnation as "senseless repetition," but goes on to postulate stages of growth in heaven. But the karma hypothesis does not admit of mere repetition. The present sums up the past and foreshadows the future.

(3) Prof. Hogg objects that karma leaves no room for history and progressive evolution. He does not take the extreme position that karma implies no freedom at all but argues that the freedom allowed by it is negligible in effect, in view of the overwhelming results of past karma in innumerable embodiments. But surely the spell of the past may be broken by the vision of the illimitable future. Hogg's difficulty arises from the aversion of the eye from future lives. Further, from the social standpoint, Hogg urges that karma leaves no room for an ultimate triumph of God's will on earth. If each individual is concerned with his own salvation and souls are to be found at all stages of evolution, it will be impossible to hope for the kingdom of God on earth, a historical period of righteousness. The social hope is removed from the eyes and minds of men. It is sufficient to point out in reply that salvation is a state of the soul characterised by the union of universal and individual spirit. No purely personal salvation is possible on the Hindu theory. Further, the historical hope remains potent, for the Enlightened come back again and again until there is universal salvation. Further, it may be urged that to look for a "far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves" is to make the moral point of view absolute. It is to forget the religious and spiritual point of view from which the universe is already perfect. In Green's words perfection is already realised in an eter-

nal consciousness. Again karma does not deny the historical significance of the particular movements of humanity, but it is certainly against the pre-eminent fitness for grace of any one people or race.

(4) Prof. Pringle-Pattison points out that rebirth implies the discredited idea of "soul substance"; inconsistently enough he advocates immortality. It is enough to point out that the idea of immortality is meaningless apart from the survival of "something" corresponding to the soul. To accept immortality and reject rebirth on the ground of an objection to "soul substance" is unconvincing.

(5) Miss Lily McDougall in the co-operative volume *Immortality* (edited by Canon Streeter) objects that the rebirth idea "makes childhood, which appears so beautiful and so holy as the beginning of a virgin soul, a gigantic lie. It is hard to conceive how any mother can look into the dawning intelligence of her child's eyes, and be satisfied to believe that in innumerable past lives that same soul has gone through experience savage and civilised, has probably been in turn harlot or rake, victim or tyrant, wife or warrior, layman or priest and perhaps all these a hundred times". (p. 301). Evidently, in the opinion of this writer, a blank soul is more beautiful than one which comes "trailing clouds of glory". Further it is open to the mother to realise the greatness of her opportunity. Her child has

chosen her of all others, as its spiritual as well as physical nurse. The privilege of assisting it to get a hold on spiritual values, and if possible to build a future better than the past, is surely a sufficient recompense for the loss of a sentimental illusion.

(6) McTaggart points out that rebirth gives scope for the realisation of all our capacities, bad as well as good. "We cannot learn the lesson alike of Galahad and of Tristram and of Caradoc. And yet they are all so good to learn. Would it not be worth much to hope that what we missed in one life might come to us in another?" (*Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 138). Prof. Pringle-Pattison objects that there is no continuity between Galahad and Tristram and Caradoc. But we have already pointed out that there may be continuity without brain memory and that a higher memory may supervene. And Prof. Taylor objects that "it would be anything but apostasy and a return to the flesh pots of Egypt for one who had been a Galahad to lead the life of Tristram". (*Faith of a Moralist*, I, p. 320.) He draws the conclusion that the "kind of immortality contemplated is radically unethical". We may reply that there is no guarantee of continuous progress. McTaggart's idea expresses a profound truth that desire determines destiny. If Galahad desires to have the experience of Tristram, he will become Tristram in course of time. Not a wish of the heart goes to waste. This idea only renders

the moral life more strenuous. But there is the satisfaction that the range of good is also infinitely widened. Newton may desire to clothe himself with the attributes of St. Francis. Einstein may desire to contribute to eternal peace.

(7) It is objected that the *modus operandi* of reincarnation is inexplicable. But so is that of the first incarnation. As Dr. Ward points out, "what to us seems complicated or impossible may be really as simple as say, movement into a third dimension, which yet a being confined to two may fail to understand." (*Realm of Ends*, p. 405.) McTaggart hazards the speculation that souls find the parentage suited for them by a kind of chemical attraction.

(8) It is sometimes urged that heredity accounts sufficiently for the original differences in endowment and aptitude between individuals. But the moral question of justification still remains. Why should a person suffer for the misdeeds or physical defects of his ancestors? Qualities of mind and body are part of the stuff that the soul has to confront. Karma offers the hypothesis that the whole environment, physical, mental and social, into which a soul is placed is the reward or punishment accorded to it, not by any external law-giver but by the natural working of the inherent laws of the universe; so that souls may choose their heredity just as individuals may

choose their hats. (McTaggart.) Thus destiny is forged by every act and attitude of the soul. In this light the objections urged by Pringle-Pattison and Hogg that karma postulates a judicial tribunal of external nemesis become meaningless.

(9) It is said that rebirth becomes a rational hypothesis only on the assumption of a personal God. But the passage from a moral universe to God is assured more logically than the passage from God (the unknown) to the moral universe. (The Editors of *THE ARYAN PATH* pointed out with reference to a correspondence that a personal God was unnecessary for a hypothesis of karma.—July 1931, p. 498.)

Thus the hypothesis of rebirth retains the infinite moral evolution postulated in the doctrine of immortality in a more natural form, free from *ad hoc* hypotheses such as those of special purgatory, progress in heaven, ultimate triumph in history, predestination and grace and so on. Both are moral postulates, but rebirth makes fewer assumptions and enables us "to reach even tentatively a completer and more satisfactory Weltanschauung". "From this point of view death becomes indeed but a longer sleep dividing life from life as sleep divides day from day; and as there is progress from day to day, so too there may be from life to life." (Dr. J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, pp. 405 and 407).

M. A. VENKATA RAO

THE MAMMON CALLED OPIUM

[**Ellen N. La Motte** is the author of *The Opium Monopoly* (1920), *The Ethics of Opium* (1924), and other volumes. She served in the war as a nurse and was decorated with the medal of special membership of the Japanese Red Cross. Since the article was written a new report has been published—*Conference on the Suppression of Opium-Smoking* held at Bangkok 9th to 27th November 1931 (Allen and Unwin, 5s.)—but it does not change the arguments and contentions of our able contributor.—EDS.]

There are two social and economic problems which demand immediate solution—two halves of the same thing, namely, the opium and drug traffic. One arising out of the other. One, however, is legalized and flourishes with impunity, while the other is clandestine and has arrayed against it the force of public opinion. It is this legalized traffic, as it affects the Orient, which seems the more evil of the two—this callous and cynical policy which for years has been pursued in the Far East by the European rulers of Oriental peoples. Selling them as much opium as possible, for the sake of the revenues. Not selling opium to their own people in Europe, mind you. Far from it. But to people in their colonial possessions in the Far East, where they could get away with a traffic they did not dare introduce "at home". Yet it would have been equally profitable if introduced "at home," through the medium of licensed shops, licensed divans, and the ordered monopoly of sales as carried on in the Orient. France, in Indo-China, runs an opium trade; Portugal in Macao, does the same; so do the Dutch in the Dutch East Indies; so do

the British in India, and their colonies of the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, the Federated and Unfederated Malay States, British North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. Tremendous money is being made through the licensed opium traffic in all these places, where self-government does not exist. But not one of these European powers has had the temerity to set up opium shops in Paris, Lisbon, The Hague or London. Why not, since there is money in it? Why isn't sauce for the goose sauce for the gander? Is the gander wiser than the goose? In not one of these four great European countries would public opinion tolerate the idea for one moment. Opium is all very well for the Orient, but not for the dominant white race. Its dominant position collapses the moment its social structure becomes permeated with opium. Europeans know this fact and act accordingly—the blessings of opium, so loudly extolled as no more harmful than a cup of tea, are reserved for one set of people alone.

Recently the League of Nations sent a commission to the Far East, to report on opium smoking. While the general conclusions were

that the time was "not yet ripe" to put an end to it, and thus carry out the international obligations of The Hague Convention of 1914 which called for the gradual and effective suppression of smoking—still, some interesting facts found their way into the Commission's reports.

Physical Effects: Gradual weakening of the body, disorganization and ultimately ruin of the digestive system; chronic and eventually organic constipation, the general lowering of vitality, etc.

Mental Effects: Lethargic state of mind, dulling of mental processes, gradual loss of will power, neglect of work, subordination of every interest to craving, opium becoming the main object of life.

Moral Effects: The undermining of moral conceptions, increasing unreliability, dishonesty, (especially in order to secure opium) and the loss of the sense of right and wrong.

Effects on Economic Position: The expense of addiction being out of proportion to the smoker's income: insufficient funds left for the sustaining of the smoker and his family, resulting in impoverishment or impossibility of improving the standard of living. Opinions differ widely on the question of opium smoking on the smoker's earning capacity. Judging by evidence, the possible reduction of earning capacity would be, on the average, as high as 50 per cent.

Social Effects: In the case of wealthy people the harmful effects of opium smoking may not be so generally apparent, but they cannot be disregarded. The working classes and small merchants feel all the effects of addiction in a far more serious degree than the well-to-do, and contribute more to the retarding of economic and social progress. As for the opium smoker of the coolie class, he spends on opium from 40 to 70 per cent of his daily earnings. What little is left has to provide for food, housing and clothing of the smoker and his family.*

These conclusions could have been applied with equal force to the eating of opium in India. Only, for some reason, the Commission did not go to India.

But in view of these facts, is it any wonder that European governments refuse to introduce opium into Europe? To sanction "at home" a practice which reduces earning capacity by one half, and of that half, some 40 to 70 per cent must go to providing more opium for the victim's needs? Public opinion in Europe would throw out a government which dared propose such a thing—licensed shops for the sale of this devastating drug.

The revenues derived from opium vary in the different colonies—from 10 to 25 per cent or even higher. A good, fat sum, in any event. What matters destruction of health, moral and physical, if such sums can be obtained?

* Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East. League of Nations, November, 1930. pp. 26-27, Vol. I.

But these percentages are very misleading. For example: In Brunei, in 1924, the opium revenue constituted 22.31 per cent of the total; in 1928 it constituted 21.60 per cent. This looks like a drop in consumption, but not so—in 1928 the general revenue was higher. Opium sales in 1924 were 58,000 Straits dollars, and in 1928 were more than 79,000.*

Space does not permit further details of these opium revenues, but it is for the sake of them that the Orient is drugged. *The only way to stop this exploitation rests with the people themselves. Just so long as they are willing to purchase Government opium, just so long will they have the privilege of doing so.* Again we repeat, this privilege is denied to Europeans in Europe. Here is what happens in London, according to a newspaper of September, 1930. "Heavy Fines on Opium Charges. Magistrate Says a Chinese Should be Deported." Then follows an account of find-

ing a Chinese in Silver Lion Court in possession of opium, and opium-smoking utensils. The man was fined £150, or three months' imprisonment. "Inspector Edwards raised the question of an order for deportation should the fine not be paid. The magistrate said in the interests of the country the man should be deported."

Yet deported to Singapore, this same Chinese may obtain from the Government a license to run an opium shop. But no nonsense like this in London. The fundamental iniquity of this licensed traffic is that one set of people feels that it has the right to drug, i.e. to destroy, another set.

Are not Orientals equally able to protect themselves, through the force of public opinion? Is Europe wiser than the Orient? Cannot the Orient see what is happening to it, and awaken to the danger of a society undermined by opium?

ELLEN N. LA MOTTE

"Shun drugs and drinks which work the wit abuse,
Clear minds, clean bodies, need no Soma juice."

GOTAMA, THE BUDDHA

* Ibid., Vol. II, page 146.

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE SECRET DOCTRINE

I.—SPACE

[Dr. Ivor B. Hart, O. B. E., was until recently an Honorary Research Assistant in the Department of the History of Medicine, University College, and an Extension Lecturer at the University of London. He is the author of *Makers of Science, The Mechanical Investigations of Leonardo da Vinci, The Great Engineers, The Great Physicists*, and numerous text-books of Physics. The following extracts from H. P. Blavatsky's monumental work will enable the reader better to appreciate the position taken by thinkers like Dr. Hart in the following article.

The duty of the Occultist lies with the *Soul and Spirit* of Cosmic Space, not merely with its illusive appearance and behaviour. That of official physical science is to analyze and study its *shell*—the *Ultima Thule* of the Universe and man, in the opinion of Materialism.—*The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 589.

"What is that which was, is, and will be, whether there is a Universe or not; whether there be gods or none?" asks the esoteric Senzar Catechism. And the answer made is—SPACE.—*Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 9.

The "Parent Space" is the eternal, ever present cause of all—the incomprehensible DEITY, whose "invisible robes" are the mystic root of all matter, and of the Universe. Space is the *one eternal thing* that we can most easily imagine, immovable in its abstraction and uninfluenced by either the presence or absence in it of an objective Universe. It is without dimension, in every sense, and self-existent. Spirit is the first differentiation from THAT, the causeless cause of both Spirit and Matter. It is, as taught in the esoteric catechism, neither limitless void, nor conditioned fulness, but both. It was and ever will be.—*Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 35.

The first lesson taught in Esoteric philosophy is, that the incognizable Cause does not put forth evolution, whether consciously or unconsciously, but only exhibits periodically *different aspects of itself* to the perception of *finite* Minds. Now the collective Mind—the Universal—composed of various and numberless Hosts of Creative Powers, however infinite in manifested Time, is still finite when contrasted with the unborn and undecaying Space in its supreme essential aspect.—*Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 487.

Physical Science will find it more difficult than it now appears to refuse room in the *Spaces* of SPACE to Planetary Spirits (gods), Elementals, and even the *Elementary* Spooks or Ghosts, and others.—*Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 620 —EDS.]

"Of one thing we may be sure," wrote Prof. A. C. da N. Andrade of London University, recently, in referring to the problems confronting the modern physicist, "for every riddle solved, two new ones will present themselves."

This is merely another form of the well-worn tag among Western Philosophers that "the more we

know, the more we realise our ignorance". How does this compare with the Eastern philosophy with which the general policy of THE ARYAN PATH is associated? It is none too easy for one who is trained in the traditions and the basic concepts of European Science to answer this question.

Differences of premises, of out-

look, of modes of thought, are not easy to bridge; but a careful and impartial study of that remarkable book, *The Secret Doctrine*, written over forty-five years ago by H. P. Blavatsky, does bring out rather strikingly two very significant points. One is that most of the problems that are confronting the modern physicist to-day were certainly discussed from the special angle of Eastern philosophy by Mme. Blavatsky half a century ago; and the second point is that the general trend of research and speculation on the part of our European savants is actually bringing them into line with the pronouncements of *The Secret Doctrine* on these topics.

We propose in the course of a series of short articles to illustrate these broad tendencies, and in order to focus our ideas upon specific examples, we will remind the reader that Western physics is to-day largely concerning itself with problems of *space, motion, and time*, and that Western psychology is dealing with *memory*. Eastern Science, with a greater wisdom and appreciation of the unification of Man and his Universe, makes no line of demarcation between the *memory* of man and the *space, motion and time* of his surroundings. Nevertheless it will be interesting to take these four concepts each in turn, and see how far the outlook in the West to-day links up (through the medium of Mme. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*), with the pronouncement of the East of fifty years ago.

We begin then with Space—a topic that is assuming an enormous importance nowadays. Einstein, need we remind the reader, has taught that space does not “go on” for ever, but bends back on itself, so that, by travelling in any one direction long enough, one ultimately returns to the starting point. The straight line, in fact, becomes the circle of infinite radius, except that the universe being on this hypothesis finite, the radius must in fact just fall short of being considered infinite. On p. 615 of Vol. I of *The Secret Doctrine* we read:

“Space is a substantial though (apparently) an absolutely unknowable living Entity”. . . . Such is, nevertheless, the Kabalistic teaching, and it is that of Archaic philosophy. Space is the real world, while our world is an artificial one. It is the One Unity throughout its infinitude: in its bottomless depths as on its illusive surface; a surface studded with countless phenomenal Universes, systems and mirage-like worlds.

The language of *The Secret Doctrine* is, to the Western mind, as esoteric as are its teachings—and incidentally this is entirely as it should be. But whatever meaning the above quoted passage may have in other directions, it at least implies a *finite* universe—a limit to what we have been wont, in the past, to speak of as the depths of space—finite because it is “substantial,” finite because it is a “unity,” because of its “illusive surface” and because of the “countless universes studding its surface”.

Of equal significance is Mme. Blavatsky's reference to a “finite

Kosmos” on p. 277, Vol. I, of *The Secret Doctrine*.

There is but one indivisible and absolute Omniscience and Intelligence in the Universe, and this thrills throughout every atom and infinitesimal point of the whole finite Kosmos which hath no bounds, and which people call SPACE, considered independently of anything contained in it.

Here is, as we see it, a complete consonance between cosmological theories of twentieth-century mathematical physicists and the nineteenth-century classical exponent of Theosophical doctrines. The Kosmos remains limitless in that its depths are incalculable—but it is a finite Kosmos none the less.

Further, the bending back of space upon itself, that is responsible for the deduction of Western physicists of the finiteness of the universe, brings us directly to the “great circle” doctrine that has so repeatedly shown itself in the history of philosophy and that Mme. Blavatsky refers to so specifically on pp. 359-360 Vol. I, of *The Secret Doctrine* as the universal symbol of the Mundane Egg. “It typifies the great Circle, or O, itself a symbol for the universe and its spherical bodies,” and quoting from the Vishnu Purâna (Book I, Ch. 2), we read, “Intellect (Mahat) . . . the (unmanifested) gross elements inclusive, formed an egg . . . and the lord of the universe himself abided in it, in the character of Brahmâ. In that egg, O Brahman, were the continents, and seas, and mountains, the

planets and divisions of the universe, the gods, the demons and mankind.”

One other aspect of this subject calls finally for comment. As between mathematicians and the metaphysicians of the West, on both of whom has devolved the task of answering the query, “What is Space?”, it may on the whole fairly be said that the major contribution has come from the former. Euclid, dare we say, in the brave days of old, and Gauss, Lobatchewsky, Riemann, Clifford and Einstein in more modern times, have undoubtedly dominated the field of enquiry. And they have shown that the geometrical approach as distinct from the physical approach could not fairly be ignored. For after all geometry relates to pure space, while physics is the science of matter. The theosophical view-point, however, also takes cognisance of this geometrical approach in no unmistakable fashion. So we read (and with this quotation we must perforce conclude) in Vol. I of *The Secret Doctrine* p. 612:

From the very beginning of Æons—in time and space in our Round and Globe—the Mysteries of Nature . . . were recorded by the pupils of those same now invisible “heavenly men,” in geometrical figures and symbols . . . The latter figure [i.e. the Pythagorean triangle], along with the plane cube and circle, are more eloquent and scientific descriptions of the order of the evolution of the Universe, spiritual and psychic, as well as physical, than volumes of descriptive Cosmogonies and revealed “Geneses”.

IVOR B. HART

THE COLOUR QUESTION

[Ethel Mannin left school at the age of 14, edited a magazine at 17, and published her first book at 22. The interesting story of her life is told in *Confessions and Impressions*. Of Irish origin, she has risen from the working-class with which she sympathises and for which she labours.—EDS.]

Intelligent people may agree to differ on political and religious issues, but the Colour question appears to touch something deep down in their blood, beyond the control of reasoning. A man may talk intelligently on education, sex, religion, politics, literature, the art of living, and you think, "Ah, here at last is an intelligent person as free of preconceived ideas and prejudices as a human being can be," and you feel quite safe in sounding him on his attitude towards the coloured races of mankind—and are shocked to find that here his intelligence gives out. As reason goes out by the intellectual window all the old clichés and platitudes and prejudices come in by the emotional door.

In vain do you urge that the Negro race represents one of the four main divisions of mankind; in vain do you quote statistics to show the millions by which the coloured peoples outnumber the white; and in vain point out that the primitive vocabulary of the early Aryans formed the foundation of most of the literary languages of Europe, Persia, India, —Keltic, Italic, Hellenic, Slavonic, Teutonic, etc.; in vain do you invoke the scientific facts of anthropology and prove a common origin for all humanity, whether it

be black, white, yellow, or brown. In all save a very small minority there rises up an insurmountable barrier called the Colour Bar, and as easily convince the English "‘huntin’ counties” of the barbaric cruelty of blood-sports as dissolve it.

Coming up by the Continental boat-train from Dover the other day I shared a third-class compartment with a young Negro pastor and two American women—that is to say they were in the compartment for a few moments when I entered it, but an altercation between the two women concerning "niggers" resulted in one of the women getting up to leave—whereupon without comment the coloured man himself solved the problem by going quietly out.

The woman who had used the word "nigger" looked across at me, and remarked complacently, "I was brought up in the South—I know niggers."

I preferred to remain silent, knowing only too well the futility of argument; I have encountered that attitude too often before, particularly from Americans. Anti-colour prejudice is too deep-rooted in the majority of white people to permit of eradication through even the most unanswerable of arguments. Only the gradual dissolution of the white races through

inter-marriage with the coloured races will ever dissolve that prejudice, and this ultimate merging of races would seem to be inevitable, when you consider that on an estimation of 1,646 million people in the world, 190 million are Negro, 23 million Red Indians, 665 million Mongolian, 52 million Malayan, 645 Indo-European, and only 81 million Semitic using the word in its broadest sense.

The arrogance of white people, and their intolerance of coloured people, is based on the alleged inferiority of the latter, intellectually and morally, with superb disregard for the fact that the oldest civilisations in the history of mankind were yellow and brown and in existence when white people were living in caves and tree-tops. It may well be that an unconscious fear of the preponderance and power of the coloured peoples causes white people to develop a self-protective "superiority complex"—another term for inferiority—in relation to them. Nor can it be disputed that the ingrained Imperialism of white people, particularly in the case of English people, has a very great deal to do with the anti-colour attitude. For "the glory of Empire"—that Empire "upon which the sun never sets" in spite of slums and unemployment and an exploited proletariat—India must be ruled with a firm hand "for its own good" and for the sake of British prestige in the East . . . and lest the rising tide in the East flood over the West and submerge it once and for all . . .

Only, of course, that sort of thing is not admitted in the Capitalist-controlled Imperialist press; it sounds so much better—so much more dignified, and re-assuring, to talk about India's inability to govern itself, and the glory of Empire.

A friend of mine, travelling 'deck' down to Penang after wanderings in Burma was severely reprimanded by the Captain of the ship for "lowering the white man's prestige" by travelling deck with the natives. He was told that as a public-school man he should have known better . . . Which is true; he should have known better than to attempt to pit himself against Imperialism's prejudices and tyranny of shams.

White people have little to give to the coloured peoples of the world, little to teach them, either culturally or in the art of living, whereas the coloured peoples of all races have a very great deal to give to the white, a very great deal to teach them. General Smuts once said that the African natives were the only truly happy people in the world; they lie in the sun, work only when necessary in order to eat, and live sufficient unto the day. That is one path to happiness; another lies through the philosophy of the East, that all is illusion, Maya, and only what for want of a better word I must call "the life of the spirit," living and real. That is the path to something beyond physical happiness—the path to peace, and "Sunrise in the West". Both make for a simplification of

life of which white people know comparatively nothing, and of which they will continue to know comparatively nothing until the colour bar is broken in the fusion of all races in the one race—Mankind.

As Lord Olivier pointed out some time ago the "dangers" of interbreeding and inter-marriage between white people and coloured have been grossly exaggerated, through superstition and hypocrisy on the whole colour question. *As society is at present constituted* many evils confront those who have the courage to contract "mixed marriages," but they are evils imposed by society, and by no means endemic; and society, thank heaven, will not always be as at present constituted, with its sharp and unjust and illogical differentiations of class and race, differentiations which in the latter case are directly opposed to all ethnological laws.

I am one of those who believe that Eastern civilisation gains little by the absorption of Western culture, whereas Western civilisation has much to gain from Eastern culture. But then I have little faith in Western civilisation—which reaches its monstrous apex in the United States of America, where, significantly, the colour bar is stronger than anywhere in the world—and consider that if there is any hope for white

civilisation we must look for it to Russia which, again significantly, fringes the East. Civilisation may be said to have begun in Russia with the early Aryan tribes, who finally split up, some going West into Europe, others East into Persia; it may well be that civilisation will revert to its cradle for re-birth, and the new civilisation acknowledge only one race—Mankind. Then it will be purely an incidental matter of geography as to whether a man be Negro, Hindu, Chinese, European etc., and the colour bar—with all its injustice and absurdity—be as undreamed of as a "bar" between Scotch or English, Northerners or Southerners, Parisians or Provençals.

In the meantime it is futile to attempt to convert people on the colour question; centuries of prejudices and superstition have caused the taboo to become too deeply implanted; the most that can be hoped for or achieved is for the minority who do not recognise any colour bar to reach out to each other without fear or prejudice, meeting each other on the common ground of humanity, taking what each has to give, and with a respect free of sentimentalising or romanticising, never losing sight of the fact that in the end the colour question must and will dissolve of itself.

ETHEL MANNIN

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

A WESTERN VIEW OF INDIAN POLITICS*

[G. D. H. Cole is well known for his political and economic writings. In this review-article he presents a point of view to British politicians, one which especially those who are trying to mould India's political future ought to consider seriously. To Indians also he has a definite suggestion to offer.—EDS.]

At the present moment, the very foundations of politics and government are more unsettled than they have been for centuries in Western Europe. We English, at any rate, were fully of opinion, half a century ago, that we had settled the fundamental principles of politics once and for all, and that the history of the coming generations would be no more than a working out, and extension to new countries, of basic ideas already accepted as valid in a universal sense. The Englishmen of Queen Victoria's time had arrived, by a series of revolutions and reforms and also by a long continuous development of political theories, at a set of ideas which seemed as firm and unquestioned as the parallel theory of economics worked out by the classical economists. There were, indeed, critics of the prevailing political philosophy—anarchists, who repudiated all government as the illegitimate exercise of force, Hegelians who based their teaching on the unity of the State and not on its supposed democratic sanction, and Marxian Socialists who challenged, in the name of the Materialist Conception of

History, any static conception at all of the structure or government of the perfect Society. But these critics were little heeded: the common view was that the State, under the parliamentary system, was destined to work out more and more fully the implications of representative democracy, and that parliamentary institutions could be regarded with assurance as the last word in political wisdom. As democracy advanced, more and more nations would become thoroughly parliamentarised; and the goal for the subjected peoples outside Europe was to be a parliamentarisation which would arise as the completion of a long process of political education carried through under the auspices of their masters. In this sense, such ideas as the "progressive Indianisation" of the government of India implied the corresponding "westernisation" of those Indians who were to participate in the government.

To-day, all this magnificent certainty is dead. The Englishman can no longer set out with confidence to westernise India, because he feels no assurance of the stability of western institutions even

* *Indian Culture through the Ages*. Vol. II. Public Life and Political Institutions, By S. V. VENKATESWARA, M. A. (Longmans, Green, London. 12s. 6d.)

in his own country. His traditional conceptions alike of parliamentarism and of democracy are being challenged more and more menacingly on every hand. Where before he only wondered how long it would take the whole world to imitate the technique of the "Mother of Parliaments" and to join with him in working out the implications of parliamentary self-government to the full, he is now compelled to take stock of strange new currents of political doctrine flowing from East to West, and to consider whether he may not have to tear up the very foundations of his own political system in order to build a barricade strong enough to resist the invaders.

It is true that, in the last resort, the ideas which are challenging western parliamentarism are themselves western; for they arise out of the Materialist Conception of History and the doctrine of the Class Struggle formulated in Western Europe by a German Jew. But the ideas of Karl Marx have come to self-realisation first in Russia; and the territory of the Soviet Union, if it touches at one end the western world, reaches also to the borders of India and China, and is far closer in many respects—above all in the traditional ways of living of its millions of peasant households—to the East than to the West. That is why Communism is able to menace the world of western capitalism over so wide a front; for it appears to have devised a form of government capable of

appealing not only to the industrial proletariat of Western Europe but also to the poor peasant populations of Eastern Europe, of India, and of China.

I do not suggest that this challenge has yet destroyed the faith of the West in its traditional institutions. But it is beyond doubt that this faith has been weakened, and that the Fascist movements which have arisen in one European country after another where Communism has grown strong, have been able to ward off Communism, or Socialism only at the cost of abandoning the old beliefs in parliamentary government.

In such a situation as this, the minds of thinking people become exceptionally open to new impressions; and it is natural that the weakening of faith in the West in its own traditional ideas about the foundations of politics should be accompanied by a rising interest in the political ideas and institutions of those great sections of humanity which have behind them radically different political histories and traditions. Above all, it is natural that those who are well aware of the fundamental clash of ideas between capitalist Western Europe and Russia to-day should seek for what enlightenment they can find in the long memories and vivid independent traditions of the East.

Yet—it has long been customary to regard the Eastern peoples as possessing least of all a talent for politics. Has not China served for centuries to the West as the symbol of political stagna-

tion? And has not India through the ages amply demonstrated her political incapacity by getting repeatedly conquered, pillaged and overrun? So we in the West have been told again and again; and, even apart from foreign conquest and intervention, India's history is full enough of internal conflict, and bears little enough the stamp of any collective capacity for political unity.

All this is true—on the assumption that political capacity is to be measured in terms of the gospel of power. But must it be always so? If it must, then indeed is India, as a political unit, probably destined for ever to be the sport of developments beyond her frontiers. If she achieves national unity, she will achieve it under the impulse of western ideas. If she takes to an international ideal, and goes Communist, she will do so under the impulse of Russian ideas. *In a world of wars, powers, contending Empires, India's rôle is likely to remain secondary and unhappy. Her chance will come only if the concepts of political thought can be changed in consequence of a shift in the necessary basis of political action—in other words, only if and when she can get the chance of developing what is in her peacefully and in a world at peace.*

This thought, above all others, is borne in upon me by a reading of Professor Venkateswara's second volume of his ambitious *Indian Culture through the Ages*. In this volume he deals with Public Life and Political Institu-

tions, and also with the movements of political thought from the Vedic foundations to the coming of the European dominion. It is Professor Venkateswara's thesis that there exists in this field a peculiar Indian heritage, Vedic above all in its origins, and owing, I think, little to any conquerors or invaders later than those Aryans who have become in effect the cultural depositories of the Indian tradition. This Indian conception naturally bases itself on what we call "local autonomy". The idea of enlarged State power is really foreign to it; and it thinks and acts far more in terms of a code of law which is the regulated embodiment of a way of life for the village and its members than of such notions as patriotism, or nationality, or prestige. In certain of its aspects it seems to me highly individualist, as Mr. Gandhi sometimes seems when he is speaking about his own soul; and yet it is deeply communal, the creed and expression of a way of living together in communities and not in isolation. Though India was lost to Buddhism centuries ago, Buddhism seems, more than any other doctrine, to express what is fundamental in the Indian tradition.

This I get from reading Professor Venkateswara's book; but I do not think he has helped me as much as he might have done to get it. He contrives to present his picture of political institutions and ideas with no more than passing references to the underlying economic conditions which

brought them to maturity. Irrigation and public works are mentioned now and again; but their overmastering importance as unifying influences is never stressed. There is no sufficient notice of the more urban ways of life of the Mohammedan invaders, no account of the historical working out of the caste system, no sufficient discussion of the parts which mountains, rivers and seas have played in the evolution of Indian political ideas, as well as in the making of Indian history. Professor Venkateswara is learned, no doubt; but I for one, after reading his work, am still at a loss to discover any real conception of the making of political forces as present in his mind.

Hence his closing insistence on India's need for strong central government, valid as it may be, strikes me as utterly unconnected with everything he has said before. Surely, in the light of all that he has said, strong central government will be for India never an end, but at most a means, and will come to her, never as an internal measure of nationalist unification, based on her own traditional ideas, but only as her part in an international movement of liberation, designed to clear the way for an era of peaceful world federation, in which at last she can settle down to develop herself freely in harmony with the great historical tradition of her Aryan culture.

G. D. H. COLE

The Life of Emerson. By VAN WYCK BROOKS (E. P. Dutton & Co. \$3.00)

Van Wyck Brooks has given us a book on Emerson which, while it goes to the heart of Emerson's lovers, leaves that heart a little cold. Mr. Brooks's style and fluency seem too often to have been used to gloss over a failure to penetrate into the arcanum of Emerson's inner life and to understand the profound spiritual hunger and realization that were his. Vivid as is the picture of life in Concord and the men who congregated round Emerson, we look in vain for any appreciation of what makes Emerson stand out so conspicuously among the spiritual pioneers of his time, one whose benign influence is felt in an ever increasing measure as we emancipate ourselves from the shackles of vicarious thinking—religious and scientific—and learn to follow our own inner Light. Mr. Brooks shows him as a leader of

men whose strength lay in the magnetism of his nature which all felt, but few appreciated or understood. How this came to be we are not told, though Emerson himself left a record of his indebtedness to the philosophy of the Ancients. Disgusted with church and dogmatic religion, Emerson turned Eastward and lit his lamp from the ever brilliant fire of the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Upanishads* as well as the Greek philosophers. It is pre-eminently to India that we must turn to find the inspiration of the *Over-Soul*, and *Cycles*, of *Spiritual Laws*, and *Compensation*.

Mr. Brooks has cleverly adapted Emerson's writings to afford us a picture of his reactions to life. It is with regret and disappointment that we lay down the book, having failed to touch more than the hem of the garment of that great liberator of the minds of men.

D. C. T.

Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science. By C. E. M. JOAD. (Allen and Unwin, London. 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Joad's book falls naturally into two parts. In the first part he attempts a destructive analysis of the idealistic theories put forth by certain modern scientific men, and in the second part he gives his own answers to the questions raised in the first part. I may say at once that both enterprises are conducted with refreshing clarity. As a philosophical writer Mr. Joad possesses an altogether unusual degree of lucidity. His obscurities are genuine obscurities. That is to say they spring either from an inherent elusiveness in the subject, or, more rarely, from Mr. Joad's imperfect understanding of the subject. They are never due to mere clumsinesses of expression. For instance, his account of the process that Eddington calls "world-building" is, compared with Eddington's own account, very obscure. But he frankly explains this by saying, "I am a layman in mathematics, and I cannot pretend to understand this argument." This is a pity for, as I may have space to explain later, the argument is an important one. I think his failure to understand it somewhat interferes with Mr. Joad's understanding of Eddington's position.

But I admit that Mr. Joad's book has convinced me that a failure to understand Eddington is very largely Eddington's own fault. Until I read this analysis I had not realised what inconsistencies (Mr. Joad thoroughly backs them by quotations) can be discovered in Eddington's philosophy. In fact, this analysis makes me doubt whether the comparatively clear outlook I derived from Eddington really does represent Eddington. I would be willing to defend my interpretation of Eddington, but I would not care to assert that I am thereby defending Eddington. As regards the analysis of Jeans I feel no such confused reluctance. Like Mr. Joad, I see no necessity for supposing that, since the world possesses mathematical characteristics, it is a *thought* in the mind of a Pure Mathe-

matician. It may be, of course, that such a world has a mathematical designer, but that is a very different matter. And if it be true, as some mathematical logicians assert, that a mathematical web can be woven round any universe containing several objects, then the mathematical characteristics of our world would seem to be a tribute more to the ingenuity of man than to the design of God. Also, we must remember that the mathematical web is by no means yet complete, and there is no real reason to suppose that it ever will be. The attempt to describe the world mathematically is still, what Newton called it, an adventure that may or may not be successful.

But besides objecting to the doctrines that may be said to be peculiar to Eddington and Jeans, Mr. Joad objects also to the whole philosophic trend of their work. Their philosophic affiliations are, it appears, with Subjective Idealism, and Mr. Joad entirely disbelieves in that particular philosophy. Eddington and Jeans, and a good many other mathematical physicists, seem to think that modern physics lends support to that philosophy. In doing so, Mr. Joad tells us, they show their philosophical *naïveté*. They are evidently unacquainted with the criticism to which that theory has been subjected by the Realist philosophers. This is probably true. It is probable that scientific men who have reached idealistic conclusions feel that they have become philosophically more or less orthodox, and we take Mr. Joad's word for it that they have, in fact, embraced a heresy. But the question is whether modern physics brings forward fresh support for Idealism. Mr. Joad says that it does not. Our mathematical physicists have not only accepted a discredited philosophy, but they have done so by misinterpreting their mathematical physics.

The establishment of this position occupies the second part of Mr. Joad's book. Here Mr. Joad gives us not only the arguments against Idealism, but also the arguments for Realism. Thus this second part has a more remote, purely

philosophic interest. It presents the case for a particular philosophic doctrine, and is therefore doubtless open to innumerable objections from a different school of philosophy. To the reader who is not a professional philosopher Mr. Joad's case may seem convincing enough but then, as one knows from experience, a totally different case can seem equally convincing. There are, nevertheless, some aspects of Mr. Joad's general outlook which are of quite peculiar interest. I refer, in particular, to his notions of the status of the arts and of mysticism. Mr. Joad believes that there are orders of reality, and that the realm of Value, of which truth, beauty and goodness are aspects, is one of the last orders to be apprehended by the developing human consciousness. The ultimate goal of the evolutionary process is, he thinks, the development of a consciousness which is directly and constantly aware of the realm of Value.

That some of the greatest art springs from an experience which is analogous to, or identical with, the mystic vision is, I think, true. And it may be, as Mr. Joad suggests, that the artist creates precisely because he cannot retain the mystic vision. His creation is an attempt to embody, and so perpetuate, an experience which is now reminiscent. The mystic who enjoys a less transitory vision has no such need to create. It is probable, indeed, that the order of reality he perceives cannot possibly be conveyed to other minds. It is only in very rare individuals that consciousness has advanced so far as to perceive this order of reality. As the mind of man has developed it has perceived more and more factors of the universe. All these factors are equally objective and equally real, whether they be physical objects, scientific objects, or the realm of Value of which the last term is Deity. They all exist independently of us; none of them are created by our minds. Indeed, Mr. Joad is so anxious to emphasize the complete objectivity of everything we perceive, to whatever order of reality it may belong, that he will not admit that any communion with Deity occurs, even

in the highest order of mystical experience. He says:

God, it is obvious, if He is to be an object worthy of our adoration, must be kept unspotted from the world that adores Him. To suppose that the mystic can enter into communion with Him is to suppose Him infected with the frailties and imperfections of the mystic; to suppose that the saint can become one with Him is to suppose that He can become one with the saint. But, I repeat, the permanent and perfect cannot be continuous with the imperfect and the changing; nor could it, without ceasing to be itself, enter into communion with the imperfect and the changing.

This is, of course, in flat contradiction to the testimony of some of the greatest mystics as to the nature of their experience. Here Mr. Joad invokes the stammering, incoherent character of the mystic utterance, and concludes that the mystics could not have meant what they appear to say. It is difficult to understand Mr. Joad's vehemence about this. I see nothing in his philosophy which forbids us to suppose that there is a divine element in man. His notion that Christ's conception of God as a Heavenly Father "degrades" God seems to me a purely personal reaction—startling and perhaps interesting, but wholly unwarranted. The thorough elaboration of this point, however, would be foreign to the purpose of this book as expressed in its title. To return to that title, I am not quite clear, as I have already hinted, that Mr. Joad's conception of modern scientific philosophy, particularly of Eddington's is correct. I am disposed to believe that it is much more in agreement with Mr. Joad's views than he imagines. Eddington's argument about "world-building," for example, is essentially concerned to show that science—mathematical physics, at any rate—is concerned wholly with structure. To use one of his own examples, the sort of information it gives us would consist, of the Big Four at Versailles, in saying that they numbered four. The evidence for this statement is to be found in the last part of his *Mathematical Theory of Relativity*, where he succeeds in deriving the laws of field physics from certain rudimentary postulates about structure. If the Quantum Laws are eventually in-

cluded in field physics, as Einstein and others think they will be, all physical laws will be accounted for in this way. Whether or not Eddington is correct in his interpretation is not here the ques-

tion. But the fact that he holds that interpretation does, I think, make his philosophy somewhat less open to Mr. Joad's objections.

J. W. N. SULLIVAN

A Manual of Buddhism for Advanced Students. By MRS. RHYS DAVIDS. (The Sheldon Press, London. 7s. 6d.)

Dedicated to her husband and son, the present *Manual of Buddhism* contributed by Mrs. Rhys Davids to the stock of literature—voluminous, but, by no means luminous—in English on the metaphysical speculations and ethical doctrines of Buddhism, is sure to be welcomed. It is a systematic attempt to reconstruct from the original Pali sources the genuine teachings of Gautama Buddha, which, she rightly complains, have been either totally lost or obscured in subsequent writings bearing on that school. Not in any manner interested in the Vedantic repudiation of the tenets of Buddhism, but devoted only to a historical study of the natural evolution of ideas and doctrines of Buddhism, Mrs. Rhys Davids has endeavoured to exhibit that Monasticism, Pessimism, Monkishness were far removed from the heart of Buddha, and that his message is intended for those who evince a dynamic, real interest in life. What is the fundamental and foundational message of Buddhism to war-weary and yet war-welcoming humanity?

Let me write down the message in Mrs. Rhys Davids' own words:—

The man as (a) capable of *More* [italics mine], (b) as amenable to a teaching in the *More*, (c) as seeking and finding a *More*, here and hereafter, *not* through seclusion, but, in carrying out his duties in the life of the world, as (d) capable either directly or through the more gifted few, learning how to grow in the *More*, and to make his fellows grow in it—this is man as conceived and taught by the founders of Buddhism. (p. 310)

Mrs. Rhys Davids would surely consider the "chronic recluse" and the "cenobitic Monk" as marking a fall from the ideals advocated by the founders of Buddhism who laid emphasis on a life of dynamic activity lived according to the standards of Dharma, and were dedicated to the finding of the *More* in each and to the enabling of others to find It. Avoidance of the extremes of hilarious hedonism and an irrational mortification of desires, cultivation of the will to help one's fellowmen, and a progressive realisation of the *More* constitute the essential elements of Buddhism as taught by its founders. The call of Buddhism is to find the true self in man.

Mrs. Rhys Davids need not be reminded that it is the *More* that is appealed to when individuals, communities, and nations determine and regulate their behaviour or behavioristic responses in their careers of unmitigated exploitation and self-aggrandisement, and if Buddha came to India and if Christ came to Chicago, they would be confronted with monumental repudiations of Buddhism and Christianity. When at the present day "men read a little monk-formula here, a little verse there and then—Heaven help them!—set to and write something on Buddhism" (p. 334), students and sympathetic admirers of Buddhism have every reason to feel grateful to Mrs. Rhys Davids for her endeavours to get at the heart of Buddhism embodied in the original Pali Texts. May she be spared long to continue her scholarly researches and investigations inspired by the ideals held dear by her late lamented husband.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Vision of Asia. An Interpretation of Chinese Art and Culture. By L. CRANMER-BYNG. (John Murray. 15s.)

Mr. Cranmer-Byng, as co-editor of the "Wisdom of the East" series, has done more than most Englishmen of his generation to foster that mutual understanding between the East and the West upon which the future development of mankind more and more depends. And in this book he distils very delightfully and persuasively the wisdom which he has derived not only from an imaginative study of Eastern art and literature, but from life itself as he has experienced it both through contemplation and action. For the charm and conviction of his book are due primarily to this, that it expresses both a rare sensibility and that mellow human insight which comes of a selfless acceptance of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. The artist is richly endowed with the former; the public servant and man of affairs may slowly acquire the latter. It is the distinction of Mr. Cranmer-Byng to have combined the two. And there is another reason why his book should prove of particular value to Western readers. "The discovery of spiritual bonds uniting East and West" is here, as it has always been, his adventure. But those who are acquainted with his contributions to the Series that he has edited will know that he has lavished his love and his understanding particularly on China. The roots of all religious life, he would probably admit, are in India with its "vision of Being, the power of Knowing that in the midst of change and impermanence we are in Life". And this religious basis he never forgets. It is the soil out of which the human spirit flowers in all the fair forms of beauty and of art. But true to his practical sense of citizenship in this world he is less concerned with the dark abyss or the eternal beyond than with the objective realisation of the creative purpose in human life. And in China he discovers and through its sages, poets and painters and its golden age he communicates "the art of living which

comprehends all the arts in one". And this emphasis upon life as an art is of unusual value to-day both from a Western and an Eastern standpoint.

Art and science, grace and utility, have become disastrously divorced in the West, with the result that art separated from life has degenerated into æstheticism, while life divorced from art has become an ugly whirl of material forces. Similarly in the East, though in a different way, the art and the religion of life have tended to become separated. Liberation from, rather than a true and perfect expression of, life has been sought with social consequences that are only too apparent. A writer, therefore, who holds the balance so justly and sensitively between the reality which underlies and transcends all form and the organised harmony which embodies it, performs a real service both to East and West. He may at least do something to correct the Western view that a sensitiveness to Ultimate Reality is incompatible with Western ideals of active order and efficiency, and at the same time combat the materialist heresy that order can be technically imposed upon life by scientific or communistic autocrats. He may, too, persuade the Easterner through the example of one of his own cultures that the Ultimate Reality to which he is so profoundly drawn can only be fully realised through creative action and demands embodiment at every level of human and social life.

The appeal of China in its golden age to one who appreciates so well the reciprocal relations of the spiritual and the material is easy to understand. For the two teachers who inspired its culture, Lao Tzu and Confucius, combined perfectly to balance in men's minds the two aspects of life, the in-going and the out-going will, feminine surrender and masculine action, the timeless flow and the significant expression of that flow within the limits of time and space. As Mr. Cranmer-Byng writes:—

Broadly speaking, we may say that the Taoism of Confucius and Lao Tzu has a common stem but that each branches off in a different direction. The Tao of Confucius is

principally concerned with the conduct of man in his relation to his fellow-men, through the Family, Society, and the Race. That of Lao Tzu seeks to co-ordinate the Tao of man with the Tao of Heaven and of Earth.

Separated or imperfectly co-ordinated, each leads to death, the one to that of static formalism and conservatism, the other to a fugitive self-absorption or a mild and fluid incapacity. And Mr. Cranmer-Byng shows in his short but vivid record of the T'ang and Sang Dynasties that the periods when decay set in were always those in which the balance between the idealistic and the practical impulses was not maintained. But a true Taoist philosophy combines them both in a vital equilibrium. Its very basis, as he remarks, is the "sameness of origin between the spiritual and the material," and its "inevitable goal" is "a Unity where the two are One".

Mr. Cranmer-Byng is so entranced by and so perfectly at home with the culture of China in its golden age that he tends perhaps to attribute to it a higher degree of spiritual significance than it really possessed. In his own philosophy he distinguishes indeed clearly and carefully between true art and æstheticism, the creator and the diletante. But the picture he draws so delicately and delightfully of life in China in the days of her spring and autumn flowering, although it reveals how sensitively the pleasures of art and the duties of service were blended, suggests, too, that this culture, so fair and subtle in outward feature, failed quite to realise the deeper spiritual significance of life. Duty and pleasure were rather equitably balanced than resolved in a profounder unity. The prevailing impression left is of a people for whom life was a gracious holiday when the necessary tasks of citizenship had been performed. A rare sense of art informed, indeed, their leisure as a fine sense of discipline pervaded their social service. But the reality which transcends in a perfect service and expression of the spirit alike the exquisite cultivation of the senses and the conscious and high-minded exercise of the social faculties was in some degree lacking. And this was due as

much perhaps to the quality of Lao Tzu's vision as to the native Chinese temperament. That he was to some degree one-sided is shown by the fact that his teaching needed to be balanced by that of Confucius. His quietism, his yielding surrender to the flow, his philosophy of inaction, although they meant something very different, as Mr. Cranmer-Byng shows, from indolent acquiescence, reflected too much the feminine mode to embody a perfect gospel. And although Taoism, through the addition of Confucius, combined the *Yin* and the *Yang*, the female and male principles, the marriage never seems to have been quite the creative unity which Mr. Cranmer-Byng suggests that it was. To Westerners, however, in whom the male principle of self-assertion has been so over-developed, Lao Tzu's inspired femininity may be safely commended. And Mr. Cranmer-Byng's appreciation of it is so finely balanced by his respect for "the outward Confucianist" that he preaches equally a "wise passiveness" and an enlightened activity. There is nothing relaxed in his belief in "the immense patience of Beauty," and his view of æsthetic perception and creation as the crystallisation in living forms of the religious impulse is of particular value to-day when, "with the coming of the four-hour day comes the essential education for leisure for which the world has waited overlong".

His book is richly educative in this essential sense. It unveils the secret of being because its author has discovered the secret in himself. Like the golden age of which it tells, it is "the mellow fruit of long experience and slow maturity" and utters a gentle and persuasive challenge "to the turbid and aimless powers of Doing". It constantly affirms directly or by suggestive implication the underlying unity of man with Nature and of both with their divine source. And it expresses this unity, this identification of the self with the not-self, in the living and gracious texture of its style, at once fine and flowing like the clear water of the Chinese poet "which both receives and

reflects, which is a source of life in itself and a giver of fertility to the lands it passes through". There is nothing, writes Mr. Cranmer-Byng elsewhere, "that is incapable of co-operating in the purpose of Creation. And the final test of every work of art lies in the appeal of its vitality to ours; not in the flower but in the flame that kindles it into beauty and ourselves into recognition and response. Thus the art of life consists not merely

in the ability to see the flame but to bear the flame, to liberate and let it pass from us into a future beyond our day."

The flame that inspires his writing may lack at times an intense vitality, but it is always transmuted into light, the light of a humane understanding which sheds its rays of liberating wisdom equally in the golden age of China, the steel age of to-day, and the "Cosmopolis" of an ideal to-morrow.

HUGH P.A. FAUSSET

Martyrdom in Our Times. Two Essays on Prisons and Punishments. By A. MITCHELL INNES. (Williams and Norgate Ltd., London. 3s. 6d.)

A wise, generous, and humane sentiment pervades this little book. It is an arraignment of modern penal methods, and a defence of the practices of the East in this regard. The author, who has had long administrative experience in Egypt and Siam, and has acted as a visitor to one of the prisons in England, writes with an intimate knowledge of the subject. He has personally observed the conditions in which modern legal systems work, and the deplorable consequences to which they lead. It is indignation at those consequences which has prompted the two essays—written at different times—which are here brought together.

The reforms Mr. Innes suggests are sketched only in outline, but his main criticism is that the system of legal trial and punishment in force in the modern State is brutal, impersonal and mechanical. It takes no account of the infinitely varying circumstances of character, education and motive which are involved in every crime; and the punishment it inflicts—chiefly imprisonment—is calculated to aggravate the very defects, moral and physical, which produced the offence. The traditional system of judicial administration in Eastern

lands is, on the contrary, local, personal and flexible. It allows for a full consideration of all the relevant facts of a case, and not merely whether the particular breach of law—or custom—did actually take place or no. And it enables a balance to be struck in every instance between the claims of the law and the claims of religion and morality.

Mr. Innes, I think, goes to the root of the matter when he declares that "poverty is at the bottom of nearly all crime". Every dominant aspect of contemporary social life is given over to a glorification of material possessions, and yet the vast world of the poor is "sordid, squalid, underpaid and under-fed". Constantly before its eyes is dangled the picture of wealth, comfort, prosperity—everything they are denied and know they can never have—if they keep within our iron law. "What Justice is there," asks Mr. Innes, "in our punishing them when we have employed all our art to tempt them to their offence?" It must be said, however, in criticism of the whole argument, that the author does not consider how his treatment of the subject might be modified in the light of a theory which does not regard the individual life as a flash in the pan, so to speak, but a stage in a continuous process of gathering and liquidating *Karma*.

K. S. SHELIVANKAR

Dead Towns and Living Men. By C. LEONARD WOOLLEY. (Jonathan Cape, London. 4s. 6d.)

The book was originally published by the Oxford University Press in 1920, and it is reissued with two additional chapters twelve years after,—which alone is guarantee for the sustained interest in the volume, quite apart from the fascinating personality of the renowned archaeologist who keeps us company through every page. From the early days of his apprenticeship (1911-12) in Egyptology when Mr. Woolley excavated some XIX Dynasty graves in Nubia, through desultory diggings in the ancient Sabine city of Teanum (near Naples), down to systematic explorations of the antique sites of Turkey-in-Asia, notably of Carchemish, we are conducted by the author with so much directness of appeal and such an irresistible humour that we are often at a loss to decide whether we should admire the solid qualities of an archaeologist or challenge the delicious vagaries of a descendant of Robinson Crusoe.

The Kurd and Arab workers were fighting their German employers of the Bagdad Railway, and there turns up Mr. Woolley to stop, by magic as it were, a pitched battle! The British Museum takes up the systematic excavation of Carchemish, following up the work of Mr. Hogarth; and the Turkish political officer—Kaimmakam of Birijik—attempting to hamper the excavation by taking cover under red-tapeism was promptly brought to his senses at the point of Mr. Woolley's revolver. The village judge, Cadi, taxed the patience of the English archaeologists by making them appear before his court which had no jurisdiction over the British, thanks to the Capitulation; a second revolver trick by Mr. Woolley and the Cadi capitulated! Even when, after the world war, the British forces had evacuated Syria and Mr. Woolley was resuming the British Museum excavations (1919-20) on the Carchemish site, he was not spared the trouble of playing the *Deus ex machina* while Colonel C. (commanding the French forces at Jerablus

railway station) and his party were threatened by Kurdish tribes, backed by Arabs and Turks. For who else but Mr. Woolley could venture into the camp of those dangerous Orientals and produce that welcome division in the Moslem camp, giving a fresh lease of life, generously, to the condemned French garrison? All these adventures read like episodes from the pages of Pierre Loti and Conan Doyle and seem too good romance to be true history. Maybe Mr. Woolley overacted a little as he dramatised the life he lived in those sensational settings.

One fact becomes painfully obvious throughout the narrative—Mr. Woolley's total lack of humour (and charity, the twin sister of humour) while dealing with the Turks, Old or Young! The Old Turks (described above) were dealt with at the point of a revolver, the Young Turks were riddled with bullets of savage ridicule. Their civilisation is "skin-deep," their cry of "liberty and self-determination" sheer insincerity, their municipal administration execrable (*vide* chapter: Aleppo), and their general outlook so silly as to be summarised in the phrase: "Destruction of anything old is the truest progress." (page 244). If any one were to ask the author: How could such a people organise such an effective checkmating of a none too civilised or charitable plan of Christian Europe for the annihilation of Turkey, and inaugurate such a glorious regime of progressive policy under a leader of the type of Mustapha Kemal Pasha?—we do not know what would be the reply of Mr. Woolley. Good archaeologist that he is, he has proved himself a bad historian, for he has allowed his judgment to be clouded (a pardonable human frailty) by war feelings, as he betrays himself in his introductory note.

As a prisoner of war I have seen enough of Turkish brutality towards my countrymen to justify any attack upon the Turks, however bitter. [Italics mine.]

While we read such lines we almost pity Mr. Woolley the *writer* (however much we admire him as an archaeologist) for having forgotten so naïvely

that there is such a thing as the "Other Side of the Medal" (courtesies to Edward Thompson and Yeats-Brown, author of *Caught by the Turks*). If any Turkish prisoner of war in any Christian environment ever writes his impressions, we are sure his reading of Western civilisation and Christian ethics would not tally with that of our author. War is a beastly game, a legacy of our brutal ancestors which we are still trying to justify on national grounds, while attempting to condemn it internationally. And, who knows, the Turks, recently welcomed to the civilised fold of the League of Nations, are perhaps enjoying a hearty laugh (may it be the last laugh) over the pious European protestations. We are sorry as we close the book, for the too palpable elements of party pamphleteering damaging such a piece of brilliant writing and we almost regret that the Warden of New College, Oxford, to whom the author dedicates the book,

The Truth About Spiritualism. By C. E. BECHOFER ROBERTS (Ephesian). (Eyre & Spottiswoode, London. 8s. 6d.)

During the 84 years of its existence, the modern Spiritualist movement has given rise to an enormous mass of literature. The greater part of this is naturally of inferior value, and not to be taken as serious evidence for anything; but there is a residuum, which must run into scores of volumes, of works by educated—in many cases, by highly educated and intelligent—persons, who have described their own first hand experiences and investigations of the phenomena called Spiritualistic.

In the book under review, which comprises 274 pages of large type, Mr. Roberts sets out to sum up and assess this mighty mass of evidence. Such an attempt would be most useful, were it made by one who approached the task with a truly open, impartial and disinterested mind—attributes which Mr. Roberts, for all his skill as a compiler of books, appears most emphatically to lack. It is true that he makes a show

snatched Mr. Woolley away from the vocation of a "schoolmaster" and forced him to be an "archæologist". He should have resisted the temptation of charging the delightful "Pages from an Antiquary's Note Book" with the lurid colours of a mediocre war-pamphlet, and given us more of the illuminating pages describing the excavation sites of Carchemish the old Hittite capital, or modern bazaars of Aleppo, supplying "unending joy," or perfect pen pictures of his local friends like Haj Wahid, Hamoudi, or Busrawi of many wiles. We are glad that his sympathy at least for one section of his associates, "the gay, self-reliant Arabs" made the author look deeper into the problem of the meeting of the East and the West when he remarked:

May a kindly Providence long postpone the day when the officious West shall impose on them the evils of an alien civilisation and to widen its commerce or to gratify the impertinence of its missionary spirit shall make hybrid degenerates of them.

KALIDAS NAG

of impartiality by setting out, in relation to each class of phenomena, what purports to be the evidence *pro* and *con*. By carefully selecting what facts to present and what to withhold, an advocate may prove or disprove anything. In selecting *his* facts, as regards the physical phenomena at least, Mr. Roberts has taken great pains to give us only such of the evidence in their favour as is weak and open to criticism, while he describes with gusto the exposures of fraudulent mediums and anything else tending to discredit the genuineness of the phenomena. Affecting the impartiality of a judge, his function is actually that of prosecuting counsel, who begins by choosing what evidence shall be produced for the defence, and then proceeds to demolish it.

A notable instance of this is to be observed in his treatment of Sir William Crookes, the great chemist, whose investigations into Spiritualism are so well known that it would be impossible to ignore them in any book on the subject. Mr. Roberts accordingly cannot

altogether omit references to Sir William's testimony for the reality of the phenomena. With his usual facility, however, he dismisses it as worthless, thus on p. 113 he quotes Sir William as saying:

Three separate times did I carefully examine Miss Cook [the medium] crouching before me, to be assured that the hand I held was that of the living woman, and three separate times did I turn the lamp to Katie [the materialised form], and examine her with steadfast scrutiny until I had no doubt whatever of her objective reality.

On this, Mr. Roberts comments:

But was not Crookes perhaps mistaken? There can be no reasonable doubt that he did on this occasion actually see two distinct figures, both having the attributes of human beings. But one fact of paramount importance has to be considered, though Spiritualists almost invariably ignore it: Crookes failed to get the proof he desired in his own house, and, when he finally succeeded, the sitting took place, not in his laboratory, but in Florence Cook's own house, where nothing was easier than for a confederate to be introduced in the guise of a materialized spirit.

Are we then to believe that an investigator of the calibre of Crookes failed to take elementary precautions to prevent the intrusion into the séance room of a confederate of the medium?

It must not be supposed, however, that Mr. Roberts has no respect for eminent chemists; for when he can put them in the witness-box to support his own views, he treats their testimony with the utmost deference. Faraday, for example, constructed an apparatus, by means of which he showed that "table-turning" might be, and doubtless often is, caused by the unconscious muscular action of the sitters. On the strength of this, Mr. Roberts writes (p. 103):

Automatisms take many other forms, such as those muscular movements which (as Faraday proved) are responsible for table-turning, planchette-writing, the movements of the rod in water-divining, and automatic speech.

Quite possibly the immediate cause of the movement of the "dowser's" rod is the muscular action of the dowser's hand. Any one can hold a hazel twig and wriggle it about; but Mr. Roberts does not even pretend to explain how

unconscious muscular action can account for the dowser's success in finding underground springs. Moreover, one cannot help wondering how Faraday's experiment in table-turning can be said to *prove* anything whatever with regard to water-divining or automatic speech.

Of the famous medium, D. D. Home, the plain truth is that, despite all the wonderful things which are stated by respectable witnesses to have occurred in his presence, fraud was never proved against him. Mr. Roberts admits this, but in language that conveys the impression that Home ought to have been exposed, even if he wasn't. He tells us that

The materials for his [Home's] biography are abundant, but in the earlier stages they depend principally on his own statements and must be treated with reserve.

But in a previous work, Mr. Roberts did not hesitate to quote with approval Home's hostile allusions to H. P. Blavatsky and Colonel Olcott. On that subject he accepts Home as a perfectly reliable witness. It would appear therefore that Home is to be regarded as truthful, or untruthful, just as his evidence tends to support or controvert the particular case which Mr. Roberts is trying to prove.

When discussing the much investigated medium, Eusapia Palladino, Mr. Roberts admits that there is evidence both for and against her phenomena; but he throws all the stress on the latter, leaving the impression that she was a palpable fraud, and those who vouched for her, credulous dupes. He disregards the immense body of testimony (including that of Mr. Hereward Carrington, the well-known writer on psychical research and a practical conjuror), which seems to show that her mediumship was perfectly genuine, but that sometimes, when *bona fide* supernormal phenomena were not forthcoming, she attempted to supply by trickery what her sitters had paid her to produce.

Having ascribed all the physical phenomena of the séance room to fraud, Mr. Roberts goes on to consider the so-called mental phenomena, some of which

he admits to be genuine; but these, he thinks, are all explainable as the effect of telepathy or clairvoyance, those elusive faculties of the mind, about which Western psychologists know only that they exist. There can be but little doubt that a vast number of the phenomena which some people have attributed to "spirits," have really been the result of telepathic communication between the minds of living persons; but to make telepathy responsible for such phenomena as, for example, the Cross-Correspondence, which Mr. Roberts describes (pp. 240 *et seq.*), is surely to strain the hypothesis to breaking point and beyond.

In his criticism of the "Spiritist Hypothesis," which ascribes all séance room phenomena to the "spirits" of the dead, Mr. Roberts is on firmer ground, for the evidence in its favour is at best weak and doubtful. Had he but deigned to give serious consideration to the explanations advanced by the Theosophists (for whom his contempt is so vitriolic), and especially to the theory of "shells," he might have realised that it is possible to approach the study of Spiritualistic phenomena without undue credulity, on the one hand, or, on the other, an unconvincible scepticism that is no less unscientific.

R. A. V. MORRIS

Life of Sris Chandra Basu. By PHANINDRANATH BOSE, M.A., Ph. D. (R. Chatterjee, Calcutta. Rs. 2-8 as.)

This is a biography full of interesting information. It is not a literary character-portrayal of the hero whose keen mentality tried to harmonize into a single Credo, the numerous and conflicting beliefs of a Brahmo, an Arya Samajist, a Neo-theosophist and a Theosophist. Sris Chandra Basu was the strange flower of his time: influenced by western education and the political enslavement of his people, his Aryan heart inspired him to revive the ancient tradition of his land, his Aryan mind energized him to learn about and labour for that tradition. It is difficult to evaluate his services to his country and reli-

gion from the mass of valuable facts impartially collected by Dr. Phanindranath Bose. And yet, the book is very much like Sris Chandra Basu himself—in giving unexpected news and unsuspected facts; personal and kindly in one place, strongly but shyly nationalistic in another. It does not bring the philosophical stir and mental uplift which his conversations often caused; however, in this, even, it is like its hero—one had to seek out the man of knowledge in Sris Chandra Basu, and even then humbly he referred to one publication or another; so for those who desire it, the last pages of the *Life* give a list of his works. But for such a volume an Index is very necessary and we miss it.

S. B.

The Heartless Land. By JAMES STERN. (Macmillan & Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

Nature, stern and grim; a fitting background to and environment for its primitive black and barbaric white inhabitants. This, in a nutshell, is *The Heartless Land* which in eight short stories gives a vivid and unvarnished description of the settlers in South Africa, and their relations with the Negro population; showing how life, for both parties, becomes a veritable hell when

the coloured race, in whom there is "so little viciousness, so few perverse lusts" contacts brutal Whites, in whom the animal nature is predominant. The author, however, evaluates things by viewing both sides of the shield. Excepting a few human touches, there is but little of the gentler and nobler aspect of life. Besides its descriptive merit, and the information afforded of Rhodesia, the book provides food for thought for those who disparage civilization, as well as for those who extol it.

N. K.

Life in Nature. By JAMES HINTON. Edited with an Introduction by HAVELOCK ELLIS. (Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.)

We find plenty of religiosity amongst scientists, but seldom the religious sense. This is not strange, for the faculty which makes the scientist what he is, is severe analytical scrutiny; and the faculty which serves the man of religion is imagination—the sense of unity, of relation, and of beauty. Rarely—and just as rarely to-day as ever—do we find both these faculties combined. That they can be, that they must be combined to produce the fullest man, is the lesson we learn from minds like Goethe and Havelock Ellis—and James Hinton.

Hinton in company with a very few other Victorians like Edward Carpenter is still a modern preacher. This book *Life in Nature* (not *Life and Nature*) is sorely needed to-day even more than when it was written in the nineteenth century. It is capable of extricating the modern mind from Dualism—the father of a thousand other -isms that corrupt our thought. Ever since the old theology was discarded owing to the advent of science there grew up a tendency to conceive life as being grafted on to Nature—a kind of alien substance. The unfertile desert, the inhuman sea, the cold mountains were Nature; and somewhere penetrating, somehow working its way, came Life a separate, unsupported, militant project. That is called Vitalism. It is not how Hinton saw the situation. To him all Nature was *alive* and all life was natural. Life was not separated from but part of the cosmos:

The tender organic frame needs no self-preserving power within, because all the natural powers are its servants. The earth and air and distant orbs of heaven feed it with ceaseless care, and supply with unfailing constancy its wants. Life is in league with universal forces and subsists by universal law.

"What is life?" cried Shelley in the last line of his last poem just before he went to seek his answer in the halls of death. It is the smile on Nature's face, said Hinton. It is "the bright blossom

wherein Nature's hidden force comes forth to display itself, the necessary outpouring of the universal life that circulates within her veins unseen." And we know that every day the modern findings of science make this view the more acceptable.

But may we not accept this description as true, and yet do so without joy? We may. Many have accepted the picture intellectually without responding with their hearts. The universe has appeared to them as it appeared to Havelock Ellis at the age of nineteen—"a sort of factory filled by an inextricable web of wheels and looms and flying shuttles in a deafening din." Everything seemed material and mechanical. It came as a great shock of joy to Havelock Ellis when Hinton in *Life in Nature* pointed out that there was nothing necessarily *low* about matter, and nothing derogatory in the beautiful machinery of life. "You are faced," he said in effect to the melancholy victim of 'materialistic' science, "by a small ingot you believe to be gold and a large mass you believe to be clay, and you are told they are both of the same nature. You jump to the conclusion that they are both clay. *But what I can prove to you is that they are both gold.*" The organic was not to be brought down to the level of the inorganic, but the inorganic, to be raised to the beauty of the organic.

It may be doubted whether this can be called an *argument*. It is an attitude, a new adjustment to the same facts, and Hinton did not *prove* anything. It is unlikely to mean much to those who, are content to hold another view, who like the interesting German philosopher Rudolph Otto, appear to look down without misgiving upon matter as something low. But it is a book which is capable of changing the lives of those who, owing to their mental adjustment to the facts, do not feel at home in the universe. And to feel at home in the universe is the essence of religion.

J. S. COLLIS

Whom Do Men Say That I Am? A Collection of Views of Modern Authors. Chosen and Edited by H. OSBORNE. (Faber and Faber, London. 10s. 6d.)

If some visitor to Earth from interstellar space were to read this remarkable book out of curiosity about the man Jesus Christ, he would be left in a fog of complete bewilderment. Did Jesus even exist? He would read H. L. Mencken's statement: "The historicity of Jesus is no longer seriously questioned by anyone, whether Christian or unbeliever." Then he would read Bertrand Russell: "Historically it is quite doubtful whether Christ ever existed at all." He would be told by Renan that Jesus was not sinless, and by Moulvi Muhammed Ali that the exclusive sinlessness of Jesus is the very basis of Christianity. Bishop Gore would inform him that Jesus never appears as betraying any sense of error, moral weakness or insufficiency; and Nietzsche would retort that in his knowledge of the human soul Jesus was not without many great deficiencies and prejudices.

But in pondering on this chaos of violently contradictory opinions some glimmer of truth might come to him, that the recorded life of Jesus has precisely the same effect on people as any other work of genius. It is just like a masterpiece of painting. One man will be lifted out of himself by emotional adoration. Another will ascribe the whole of its power to the influence of certain schools on the artist, to his teachers or his environment. Yet another will scrape off samples of the pigment, analysing them in his laboratory. One will assert that the picture is a mass of symbolism; another, perversely, that it is a bad fake and that So-and-So is far superior.

It is indeed curious in reading this symposium of the views of forty-five modern writers about Jesus, how each manages to extract from the Nazarene just those qualities that fortify his own philosophy. Few instances of this are better than the view of Jesus held by the three Jewish writers selected—C.G.

Montefiore, Joseph Klausner, and E. R. Trattner. Renan sees Jesus as representing essentially the rupture with the Jewish spirit. But these Jewish writers regard Jesus as a Jew of Jews, laying great stress on his racial qualities, and placing him in the true succession of the prophets. "He was a friend rather than a foe of Judaism," says E. R. Trattner. The Mohammedans in their turn gladly appropriate Jesus as a prophet of Islam. "Jesus preached Islam in his Sermon on the Mount," says the Khwaja Kamal ud Din. Each commentator abstracts what he needs for himself; and as G. K. Chesterton rather cleverly points out, if the Christian Scientist is satisfied with him as a spiritual healer, and the Christian Socialist is satisfied with him as a social reformer, it looks as if Jesus really covered rather more ground than they could be expected to expect.

The publishers of this book say, "What common ground there may be in the separate answers or which of the answers prevail, is the readers' own problem." And, save in one important respect, Mr. Osborne has presented the evidence fairly and fully. He has given us much of the best opinion of the day from leading Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish and Mohammedan writers, and from scientists, philosophers, general thinkers and rationalists. But he leaves the presentation of the Buddhist point of view (as represented in modern thought) to a few inadequate phrases by Professor Whitehead, H. G. Wells, and Bertrand Russell. Yet the Rev. J. Oman's remark is quoted:—

For the prophets, and still more for Jesus, Buddha's virtues were little more than respectabilities and negations, and the vices he condemned of small account compared with the inward hypocrisies he overlooked.

It is to be regretted that Mr. Osborne has selected no writer to give any effective rejoinder to this provocative comparison.

It is impossible in a brief review to weigh against one another the views of so many writers. All that can be said here is that such men as Tolstoi, Joseph

Klausner, and H. G. Wells appear to carry sanity and conviction with them (despite their differing view-points) far more than Bernard Shaw, Bertrand Russell, Nietzsche, Haeckel, Strauss,

and the orthodox Christian apologists. A challenging book, valuable both as a work of reference and as a test of religious insight.

G. W. WHITEMAN

Shakespeare through Eastern Eyes. By RANJEE G. SHAHANI. (Herbert Joseph, London. 6s.)

For long the Western World has been content to regard its poetry as a delicate enjoyment, a refining influence, a thing of "task" and "appreciation". The best modern criticism, however, would press further. In Shakespearean commentary, the issue is being fought out with vigour. Much depends on the result. If Shakespeare is a chaos, then poetry has little meaning. But if poetry has any message at all, that message is religious, and the authority of a poet of Shakespeare's stature is overwhelming.

With much of Mr. Shahani's book I cannot agree. To him, and to many other critics, Shakespeare's work is chaotic, not powerfully philosophic, with slight religious content, and no mysticism. Mr. Shahani sees a great poet skilled to depict the actual world, a master of characterization, a myriad-minded but dispassionate observer. Therefore, he tells us, the Indian, to whom actuality is merely a veil obscuring the mystic reality, finds Shakespeare beyond a certain point barren. The "mystic quality" the Indian desires is "utterly absent" (p. 142). "As judged by India," we are told, "Shakespeare cannot be called a thinker" (p. 176). And yet Mr. Shahani admits that he is "a creative thinker": that is, that he thinks through the act of "creating". Now this is true. Moreover, all good poetry is essentially "creation". It is, also, creative: creating life and power, and vision in the reader. It awakens, and directs. And whether the poet be American, English, Indian or Chinese, its final purpose and value is not in any particular form of belief or instruction, but in the power of its symbolisms to awaken us to life and recognition. "The

quarrel," we are told, "of the Oriental with Shakespeare admits of no compromise or accommodation. It is fundamental." (p. 149) I do not believe it.

For Shakespeare is the great master of symbolic speech. A slight shift of perspective and he is rich in creative meanings. His creative vision necessarily speaks mainly of life and love, and their opposites, death and hate. We watch the drama played out, we see life victorious over death. Is this nothing? The creative process is justified by the poetic creation: so the tempests of *King Lear* and *Macbeth* dissolve in the music of *Pericles* and *The Winter's Tale*. *The Tempest* itself is, I believe, the grandest mystic document in our language. Why is it not so recognised? Simply because the poet has created so well, has so perfectly incarnated his vision in dramatic shapes and action that we fail to see any symbolic significance. Say a thing too well and it becomes poetry, and poetry is not allowed to mean anything. We think crookedly.

But Mr. Shahani's book is valuable. It attacks a vital issue, raises questions on every page of profound importance. His recent essay on *The Phoenix and the Turtle* was one of the finest pieces of Shakespearean commentary I have read. In much of this book he is illuminating. Every page is provocative at the least. He has a gift of phrase, and a wide knowledge, and, what is more important, a natural sympathy with the poetic world. If only he would turn again to prose interpretation, would bring the mystic insight of the East to elucidation, rather than criticism, of the creative visions of the West, he could do work of the very greatest importance in the service of poetry.

G. WILSON KNIGHT

Absolution. By E. BOYD BARRETT. (Geoffrey Bles, London. 10s. 6d.)

A year ago we reviewed in these columns Dr. Boyd Barrett's *Ex-Jesuit*, a book which caused a sensation owing to its revelations, from within, of Jesuit methods and psychology. Dr. Barrett, himself a famous Jesuit preacher, left the Order after many years and published his recollections based on a careful diary from an early age, adding his reasons for the step. He wrote without bitterness, not having then left the Church, but with rare discrimination. His work is a document of great and obvious value to the student of religious evolution in modern times. It is supplemented now by a book of equal interest. Dr. Barrett, fitted by the long Jesuit training for understanding the most abstruse psychological problems, became a psycho-analyst in New York. Success has followed his footsteps, his waiting-room is crowded, he has kept a record of his cases, he has a great facility for literary expression. The result is this study of "Absolution". He gave absolution as a priest; he gives it now as an analyst. For the need behind auricular confession is the same need as that which fills the analyst's consulting-room, the need for a release from man's universal sense of guilt.

The capacity for feeling guilty, together with the sense of guilt, is perhaps the strangest and the most interesting phenomenon of the human mind. It is there subtly, in some form or other, in every mind. It haunts the good man as well as the evil-doer. It cries for expression—and for forgiveness. It is mysterious in its origin and portentous in its results. It awakens very early in life as a general rule, and disappears only with one's last breath. The mistress of the kindergarten sees signs of it in the tiniest tot in her class, and the clergyman makes contacts with it on every death-bed. The sense of guilt makes some men feel themselves moral corpses. Its nature is to harrow and depress the mind. It represents self-condemnation—and the tragedy of life is that we so often condemn ourselves in the wrong.

Dr. Barrett gives us a number of curious cases from among his consultants in the last few years: gives them in full detail with all the penetrating acumen

of an ex-priest. He suggests, as a result of his recent experience, that the psychological training of priests is at fault, although in some cases the human sympathy of an individual confessor will, of course, enable him to rise above the effects of his training.

Casuistry has gone far to ruin the work of the confessional. For the casuist sin (that is, the objectively considered violation of the law) is everything, and guilt (that is, the feeling of misery and depression in the human heart) is nothing. The casuistic spirit is the antithesis of the spirit that belongs to the true confessor. The former is shocked at sin, and uninterested in guilt; the latter is deeply moved over guilt and uninterested in sin. Unfortunately the Church trains her young priests in the spirit of casuistry, and not in the other, the enlightened spirit.

The psycho-analyst can take the place of these defaulting priests, he is free from the binding restrictions of old-fashioned rules and tradition. But he must not be a suave, well-trained specialist alone; he must bubble over with the sympathies that alone give a true insight into human problems. He must, in fact, be a "mystic". And here Dr. Barrett defends the mystics from the hackneyed charge that they lag behind, vague hangers-on of religion.

Mysticism in itself has no more to say to religion than mathematics. Just as the medieval Church captured so many great painters, architects, and poets, she captured the mystics for the purpose of propaganda. But a mystic, no less than a poet or painter, can thrive without any religion in the strict sense of the word. He is by nature a creative artist, and not a worshipper or an ascete.

The creative tendencies of true mysticism are, according to Dr. Barrett, rarely studiously developed save among the Yogis of India. But there is nothing, he claims, "supernatural or unnatural" about them.

Not every horse is a steeplechaser, ready and willing to soar over stone walls and gates, though every horse can jump. Not every man is ready and willing to step off the everyday plane of thought and fly on the wings of his spirit though every man can do so to some degree.

Possessed of this mystical "creative" faculty, analyst and priest can recreate the wrecked souls who come to them for guidance. We could wish that in

writing this valuable book its author had laid more emphasis on the Eastern teaching of man's innate divinity and of the negative aspect of sin. The work of eliminating disease is necessary, absorption in Natural beauty is good,

but the permanent way to banish darkness is by the introduction of light. The East has its lighthouses, set high on the rocks of Time, whose rays flood the recesses of the soul at night making obscurities of guilt impossible.

R. A. L. ARMSTRONG

The Secret Lore of India and the One Perfect Life for All. By W. M. TEAPE (W. Heffer & Sons, Cambridge. 12s. 6d.)

This is a book on the Upanishads. All the texts have not been reproduced in translation but the most important ones have been selected and most of them have been put into verse. The passages quoted are significant as they throw light on the mystery of Atman and the philosophical conceptions of the texts, but one of the most important Upanishads, the *Mandukya* has been omitted.

The author has traced a comparison between the teachings of the Upanishads and those of Christianity. He seems to have spared no pains to acquaint himself with the meaning and significance of the Upanishadic teachings, but he has failed in the purpose, for his vision has been clouded by the missionary spirit. This is clear from the preface. He writes that "as his studies went on, and the character of the forces to be met was more clearly discerned, Hinduism stood forth as the one power that must be grappled with. That conquered, he saw the Victory of the Cross secure." From this it is evident that the author has not been able to observe that spirit of detached receptivity which alone can reflect truth and help proper understanding.

He has taken up the three fundamental metaphysical concepts: (1) The individuality of self, (2) the universality of self, (3) the mutuality of self, and two ethical concepts of sinfulness and perfection as the grounds of comparison between Hinduism and Christianity. He finds that the Bible fulfils beautifully all these conditions, but the Upanishads fall short. There may be a

clear indication of the universality of the self in the Upanishads but none of the mutuality. The author has underestimated the conception of the Upanishads. Though the final teaching in the Upanishads is the transcendence of self, the idea of individuality and mutuality in the progressive resolution of spiritual life has not been ignored. We refer the author to *Mandukya* iii (1), *Brihadaranyaka* ii (5). The idea of mutuality is clearly shown in the conception of correspondence between the Adhyatmic and the Adhidaivika forces.

Individuality, Mutuality and Universality are accepted in the life of spiritual immanence but not in transcendence, where Spirit shines forth beyond time and beyond understanding through time. This is unique in the teachings of the Upanishads.

Though the Upanishads have not produced any conception of the Son incarnated in flesh, still they have retained the possibility of every soul attaining perfect knowledge of and even identity with the One. The conception of the Son-hood centred in one person has limited the spiritual possibilities of the finite selves in Christianity.

The Upanishads have not rejected the redemptive power of grace (*vide Katha Upanishad*) and the restorative power of the Word (*vide Katha, Prasna, Mandukya*, etc.), but they maintain that the final calm and security can be brought by Wisdom. The former can give psychic fineness and receptivity of the fine influence scattered out of the Cosmic Person and the Divine perfections, the latter can give a new bent in spiritual life and reveal a phase in spiritual transcendence that is sealed to many.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius. By JOHN K. SHRYOCK, Ph.D. (The Century Co., London. 18s.)

Political Philosophy of Confucius. By LEONARD S. HSU. (George Routledge and Sons Ltd., New York and London. 12s. 6d.)

It is not surprising if Western scholars deny that the Chinese people have any political philosophy, since there is a great scarcity of authentic books on their political science. Not only to meet this real need but even to make students understand properly the social and political evolution of the peoples of the Orient in the light of their psychology, a scientific study of the political theories of the East is indeed of the utmost importance. Therefore Prof. J. K. Shryock of the University of Pennsylvania and Dr. Leonard S. Hsu of the Yenching University deserve to be congratulated on their substantial contributions which, we feel sure, will be received by all those interested in Oriental learning with satisfaction. Prof. Shryock's book is published from a fund contributed to the American Historical Association by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. In this volume, therefore, the author does not claim to treat with any degree of completeness such subjects as the life and work of Confucius, the growth of Confucianism as a school of thought, the worship of Confucius and the like. He concerns himself here mainly with an intensive historical study of the State cult of Confucius.

Since Chinese scholars have hitherto allowed the origin and rise of the cult of Confucius to rest upon uncritical traditions and fragmentary statements, Dr. Shryock has taken enormous trouble and pains to bring together a mass of valuable data from references to the State cult contained in the dynastic histories. Even these references, the majority of which are imperial edicts, have not been, the author tells us, collected and arranged with any thoroughness by the Chinese. As a background for a study of the State cult, Prof. Shryock outlines in the first few chapters

the conditions under which the cult began; and then in connection with each period in the nation's life, such as, the Han Period, the Medieval Period, the T'ang Period, the Sung Period, the Mongol Period, the Manchu Period and the Republic,—to each of which a chapter is devoted,—he reviews and explains not only the history of the epoch and the position of the scholar class at the time but also the intellectual and social forces of the period which influenced the development of the State cult. And finally the author concludes that though Confucius will never again approach the status of a deity, he will, nevertheless, continue to be the human symbol of the Chinese people. By his studious research and sympathetic study, the author has certainly succeeded in presenting to the reading public not only a scientific exposition of an Oriental cult which has endured for about twenty-five centuries, but also one of the most comprehensive histories of the State cult of Confucius that has yet been published.

In reading books of the type under review, one must be careful not to identify "Confucian" political philosophy with "Chinese" political philosophy. China, we must bear in mind, has had a great number of schools of political thought besides the Confucian system. Indeed, in China there are about a dozen different schools of political speculation. Each has had its independent development and its own influence upon the political and social progress of the Chinese people. There are legalists such as Hsün Tū and Han Fei Tzū; ceremonialists such as Hsün Tzū; political economists such as Kuan Chung; progressive absolutists such as Shang Yang; co-operativists such as Hsü Hsin; practical socialists such as Wang Anshih, imperialists such as Wang Yang-ming; constitutional monarchists such as Tung Chung-shu, anarchists such as Lao Tzū and humanitarian socialists such as Mo Ti. In fact, most of these schools have at one time or another effectively condemned the Confucianists for confusing, as they thought they did, practical politics with

theoretical morality. Leaving out of consideration these non-Confucian schools, Prof. Hsu gives in his book, *Political Philosophy of Confucianism*, a somewhat systematic presentation not only of the widely scattered ideas of Confucius and of his early disciples in the Confucian Classics and other ancient books, but also of the political and social ideas of early thinkers of the Classical school.

Maintaining that Confucianism is more or less a misleading term for the so-called Chinese Classics upon cosmology, the social order, government, morals and ethics, the author arrives at the conclusion that Confucius is not the founder of the system but largely the transmitter of the teachings of antiquity. In his chapters on the Doctrine of Rectification, Political Unity and Organization, the Principle of Benevolent Government, the Functions of the State, Law and Justice, Democracy and Representation, Social Evolution, and Political Progress, Prof. Hsu makes an excellent analysis of the Confucian principles as contained in the Classics, and makes the reader wonder how those Chinese thinkers of some two thousand years ago held political ideas which

seem so modern. A sympathetic perusal of this book cannot but make the reader join the author in his general thesis that Confucius's teaching is still relevant in many of its outstanding features, and that, not merely for China, but for the West also. The war-weary West, which is now suffering from the breakdown of its political philosophy, can certainly learn many lessons from the political philosophy of Confucianism which, laying down the true principles of good government, shows clearly the dangers of militarism, imperialism and mercantilism on the one hand, and those of anarchism, indiscriminating humanitarianism, extreme individualism and idealistic communalism on the other. At a time when the nations, after two centuries of suffering from industrial and political turmoil, are beginning to think that a mixture of politics and morality is not altogether an undesirable thing, a careful study of the political philosophy of Confucianism, made possible by such works as these under review, will, let us hope, supply that remedy which is most wanted for the social, political and moral paralysis of the present-day world.

J. M. KUMARAPPA

A Plan of Life: An Essay in the Technique of Living. By C. B. PURDOM. (J. M. Dent & Sons, London. 4s. 6d.)

The rare quality of common-sense pervades every page of this charmingly sincere little book. Great in its simplicity, earnest in its faith in Divinity and therefore in Humanity, its straightforward and definitely constructive outlook on life is sorely needed at this transition period of restlessness, dissatisfaction, scepticism, and destructive criticism. To a drifting crumbling world the author appeals:—Be constructive as well as destructive. Ring out falsehood, but ring in truth. Learn that "the secret

of successful living is to know ourselves". Man, use that which makes you man—namely, your mind, and by its help know and develop your complex being.

Starting with morals which are "the beginning of conscious human life" and which "run through every activity of man" the steps of Work, Society, Art, Science, Reason and Nature end in the summit of Religion. Certain basic thoughts on these subjects are provided, by means of which each individual can for himself outline his plan of life. The book should be read by every person who aspires to make a real something of his life.

N. K.

CORRESPONDENCE

FROM PARIS

PATRIOTISM = NATIONALISM

[J. B.'s quarterly letter meant for our November issue reached us late and pressure on our space compelled us to hold it back. It does not lose its interest or its appropriateness by the delay.—EDS.]

Patriotism was going to be the subject of my "Letter from Paris" when the September issue of THE ARYAN PATH reached us with Mr. Vernon Bartlett's article on the very same question. It points out the evil but does not penetrate deep enough to expose it. With his denunciation of Nationalism no one will disagree, but his defence of Patriotism I cannot find quite so convincing. Nothing on earth can be wholly good or wholly bad, and I grant that the feeling your contributor calls Patriotism may in itself be tolerated or even commended. But as we tried to suggest in our August "Letter," what we need in our present difficulties is not so much to look out for the good points in any idea or religion as to estimate the balance of its merits and dangers; if the latter are found to be in excess, that idea, or religion (or feeling, or custom, or incentive of any sort) should be ruthlessly fought against and rooted out; the milk-and-water, half-and-half, "fair-to-everybody" attitude will not help us through. Now I strongly suspect that Patriotism and Nationalism (as defined by your contributor) stand in the same relation to each other as the caterpillar

and the butterfly, with the difference that the patriotic feeling becomes uglier as it develops, and that its last state is far more noxious and repulsive than the first!

Mr. Vernon Bartlett draws a charming picture in illustration of the sentiment defined as Patriotism; it appeals to me all the more—to that extent I am willing to be a patriot!—that it seems to have been sketched "somewhere in France". But that feeling belongs to literature perhaps more than it does to ethics. As schoolboys we have been taught to admire Homer's "smoke rising from the roofs of Ithaca". It is a far cry from this human poetry of all ages to that modern Moloch of "patriotism" which but yesterday drove millions of men to such extremes of suffering and sacrifice. The concluding remark in Mr. V. Bartlett's article is very true: a man who is about to die for his country will visualize, not his country or his countrymen, but "the few streets or lanes, houses or fields that he knows best". But that same man *in articulo mortis* would hardly muse: "*That* is what I am giving up my life for." He would per-

ceive no reason at all for his sacrifice, and would simply feel that he is caught up in the wheels of some monstrous and incomprehensible machinery.

For my part, I have never been able to understand, still less experience, the so-called patriotic feeling. The imagination of a boy reading more English and foreign books than French ones will naturally dwell on life in other lands quite as much as on his own surroundings. Many a time I have asked my friends or my elders to explain to me what lay in their hearts and minds under the label of "*patrie*". I was never able to obtain a plain answer, and I should much like to hear if anybody who tries the experiment can meet with better success. If I examine my own heart, I shall find that a slight preference for living in this country proceeds perhaps from quite trivial or fanciful interests. For instance, it offers opportunity for conversation of a certain kind, for that exchange of "*idées générales*" which is the main zest in life for the average Frenchman: yet I know I have had many a pleasant and interesting talk with people from all over the world; I have friends, and very dear ones too, in many lands; and so my prejudice falls to the ground. Again I do like in France a certain *bonhomie* and *laissez-aller* which we find very reposing when we cross the frontier on the way home from other more formal countries; and the landscape likewise appeals to me because it is not so trim as that of

England, Switzerland, or Germany. But when I travelled in Italy in 1912, I felt as if I were in my own country, "*only more so*". So that again cannot be the foundation of my love for France. What is there in France that I cannot get elsewhere and just as good? Must I be quite honest? Shall I have the impudence to confess it? Abroad I suffer for the want of French tobacco, or French-fried potatoes!

No, I do not mean to be flip-pant. But I am convinced that if people would only be perfectly frank in their self-examination, their high-flown patriotism would always collapse into insignificant partialities of the same sort. This has weighed on my mind ever since I was a boy; it is a relief to have said it out. A young German who has lived six years in France was telling me he had once believed in patriotism; now he too feels that there is nothing in it.

Now let us look at the darker side of that personal hoard of memories and habits that we have agreed to call patriotism. In the little town where I spend my holidays a certain illiterate and unintelligent old woman was telling us all her woes. She complained especially of her daughter-in-law, she imitated mockingly her ways of speech, and added, as it were, an aggravating circumstance: "For she is not even one of us; she comes from P—!" Now P— is the next village, only six miles down the road! Here, I suppose, we have Nationalism *in ovo*,

There is no getting away from it: patriotism and nationalism are one and the same thing, the one being a polite, the other a disparaging appellation for an old, primeval feeling which is sometimes inoffensive, more often very harmful, never in any way "moral".

Your contributor alludes to Patriotism in ancient Greece or ancient Rome—a sort of halfway stage between "*l'esprit de clocher*"—the narrow, exclusive love of the native village—and our modern State-centred and State-controlled collective madness. Of course it was an advance on the tribal feeling, and this again an advance on the family spirit, and this again on the strictly egoistic feeling (if indeed it ever existed in such a way as to preclude wider sympathies, which I cannot believe). But we have outgrown that stage; we are ready to widen the circle of our devotion. Every reader of this magazine, and millions of people besides, know full well in their hearts that "the world is their country," for a host of reasons which it would be quite superfluous to repeat here.

But a shocking aspect of modern patriotism is that it is allowed precedence over common morality. An instance that occurs to me is an incident of the famous Dreyfus case when a German officer could have saved this man from a false accusation and a terrible fate, but refrained from doing so out of patriotic reasons. Similar crimes are committed every day to the supposed advantage of one or another of the Great

Powers, and nobody ventures to protest; patriotism is sacrosanct. It all derives, presumably, from the common assimilation of the Fatherland or Mother-country to a real parent; a comparison which is wrong, because our own country does little more for us than the other nations have done through their thinkers, their inventors, their artists, etc.

Another consequence which has a retarding effect on international peace and goodwill, is that no one can publicly discuss the errors or crimes of the Government of his country; yet the responsibility of the nation at large is, under the conditions prevailing in politics, a purely theoretical one. Also the peoples are much less obdurate in their errors than the speeches of their statesmen or the articles of the Press would lead one to think. Patriotism—or Nationalism—is to a large extent a conventional attitude.

Although the establishment of the United States of Europe, or better still, of the whole World, should not be delayed, it must be recognized that the various nations are not all equally ripe for this new step forward and for the breaking up of the pale within which they develop their individuality. France and Great Britain, for instance, have had an independent and unified existence for so long that the patriotic or nationalist feeling—call it as you will—may there run stale sooner than we think; not so Germany, not so Italy, still less India. The map of the world is full of new

States which must work up their nationalism for decades, perhaps for centuries, before it reaches a climax and begins to ebb. The general tendency of ethnic minorities to strive for "Home rule" is also very alarming. Before 1914 we used to be told that the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire could never go on living together. A very interesting finding of the recent Stresa Conference is their inability to live apart!

We tried to show above that the patriotic-nationalist complex is a stuffed monster which it is easy to puncture and explode if we have the will. Unfortunately too many unprosecuted criminals thrive on the rivalry and hostility of nations. They pull the strings, and take good care to fan a resentment which, left alone, would change or die out quickly enough. The absurd teaching given in most schools is not, we think, very harmful, because children are more clear-sighted than grown-

ups; in most cases, their reaction is exactly opposite to the effect desired. Most Frenchmen of my generation conceived an utter loathing for Alsace-Lorraine, because of the buncombe that was dinned into them through the pre-war schoolbooks, and because of the maps of France where *les provinces perdues* were outlined in a paler tone. From which the Germans understood "*la revanche*" to be the main pre-occupation of young Frenchmen, whereas the latter desired nothing as much as a *rapprochement* with those neighbours whom their fathers had fought. When we were grown up, unfortunately, we fell into the trap laid for us by means of the Press, and our "enemies" did exactly the same. A World Conference for International Peace should begin by finding out a means of turning the daily papers into a harmless institution; otherwise its labours will probably be wasted.

J. B.

DISCOVERY OF MANICHEAN WORKS FROM EGYPTIAN SANDS

Until the beginning of the present century we only knew about Mani and his religion that which the opponents of this faith described and refuted as his heresy. Not only had the State and the Church of Persia to fight against the new religion, but the Christians also saw therein a formidable rival when it spread westwards, and—we may well surmise—the Buddhists when it spread eastwards; even much later the Muslims too had to work against it. Its real power and progress however came into fuller light when original documents and fragments in different languages were dis-

covered in Chinese Turkistan. Middle Persian and Sogdian, Turkish and Chinese are the idioms employed in those fragments. The work of the decipherment etc. is still being carried on by a number of eminent authorities and now we have the happy tidings of a new discovery, this time from another continent and in another language.

Once again the honour of making this discovery falls to the lot of Germany. The Prussian Academy of Sciences has often sent Prof. Dr. Carl Schmidt on scientific expeditions to Egypt. On the last occasion, in 1930, he managed to procure a library of papyrus books found by Fellahs in the south-western Fayum

at Medinet Madi. With the help of a friend of science he was able to buy the half of them for his native country, whereas the other half has passed into the hands of a private English collector, Mr. Chester Beatty. Damp has naturally made a havoc in the pages, but the skill of the excellent curator of the Berlin Museum, Dr. Ibscher, is a guarantee that everything legible will be made available. Numerous pages are separated and preserved under glass. A preliminary report has already been prepared by Prof. Dr. Carl Schmidt with the assistance of Dr. Ibscher and Dr. Polotsky; and Prof. Lüders (who visited India some years ago) has just now presented it to the Berlin Academy.

There are seven works in the collection. The first work of more than 500 pages divided into 172 or more chapters contains the revelation-sermons of Mani to his disciples. Every chapter begins with: "Again spake the apostle to the disciples." The second work is a collection of Mani's epistles. The third work is historical. It too covers more than 500 pages, and relates among other things the imprisonment and martyrdom of Mani, and the persecution of his followers in Persia. These three works are preserved in Berlin. The following two are divided between London and Berlin—one contains the sermons from the circle of Mani's disciples, the other seems to be a commentary on the "living evangel or gospel" of Mani. The sixth work is wholly in London. It contains psalms and hymns, more than 230 in number. The last work is not yet examined.

All these works are in the Coptic language, which shows that the religion of Mani had a strong hold over the Egyptian population also. Some of the contents are sure to be found in the fragments from Chinese Turkistan, but for the rest the present Coptic version will remain our sole source till another

discovery is made. Moreover, the historical work will throw many a sidelight on the Sasanian period. We may quote here an interesting detail which Mani himself writes about his mission to India.

Towards the end of the reign of King Ardeshir I went out to preach; I travelled by ship to the country of the Indians. I preached the hope of life to them, and selected the best of them from that place. In the year when King Ardeshir died (241) and his son Shahpur became king . . . I travelled from the country of the Indians to the country of the Persians.

J. C. TAVADIA

[In a subsequent issue we will publish, from the scholarly pen of Sir Jivanji J. Modi, an article reviewing *Researches in Manichaeism*, with Special Reference to the Turfan Fragments, by Prof. A. V. Williams Jackson.]

AN EXPLANATION

I have read with great interest your editorial comment on my letter which you have been good enough to publish. I just beg to make one observation about an "inconsistency" which you have been pleased to detect in my letter. It is my misfortune that I fail to see where the inconsistency lies. I can entirely agree with Mr. Dernier because he has not written on Western civilisation, but on a particular narrow topic of the Thrill Psychosis. Any one can point out a particular defect in a society without thereby implying that there is nothing good in that society. I should have gladly agreed with Mr. Chitnavis if he had really focussed his attention on the good in Indian civilisation, as you are pleased to annotate. Unfortunately for your annotation any one who has read Mr. Chitnavis' article will easily be able to see that he was far more interested in the Miss-Mayo-method of finding out defects in others than in seeing the good in them.

A. R. WADIA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

An extremely interesting struggle for religious freedom and cultural independence generally is being waged in the island of Bali which lies east of Java. This beautiful island, "besung so oft and oft" of late, has remained, until recently, practically inviolate and unspoiled by Western or other foreign influence. An ancient Hindu civilization still flourishes there intact, the ancient temples are still the centres of village and national life, and the ancient gods are still prayed to and consulted on the eve of any new undertaking, whether individual or communal. In the course of the last few hundred years an occasional effort has been made to convert the Balinese from their ancestral religion, but without much success. The old traditions have always proved too powerful.

Another such effort is now about to be made, or rather, a Dutch Missionary Society has applied to the Dutch Colonial Government for permission to establish a mission on the Island. Without such permission work of this kind may not be started in the Dutch East Indies. In the past this fact has meant little more than a formality to be complied with. But in the present instance things are working out

differently. The Government is being asked to pause and think twice before granting the desired charter, and the text of the statute regarding the establishment of missions is quoted in connection with conditions existing in Bali, as showing that in this particular case it would be inadmissible for the Government to approve.

The article in question provides that permission shall be withheld or withdrawn if the mission should prove detrimental to the people at large, if it should disturb the peaceful and orderly progress of affairs. This has generally been interpreted in a rather narrow, strictly political way. Not so on the present occasion. Protests are being registered in various quarters. Publicists, archaeologists, Civil Servants even, of European blood, (all honour to them!) are pointing out how a fine thing will be ruined if a foreign religion is allowed to disturb the harmonious workings of Balinese society as it is at present, and on the 19th of October last the eight native representatives of the Dutch government on the Island sent a petition to the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies to withhold consent.

In the address they presented to His Excellency, these gentlemen pointed out, that they were bound

by their oath of office to see to it that the rights of the native communities to independence in the management of their own domestic affairs were in no way infringed; that they regarded the religion and the social polity of the Balinese as inseparable parts of one organic whole and that they therefore considered that the social equilibrium of Balinese life would be disturbed if members of the community were to embrace any form of Christianity. They evidently foresee that any such effort as the one contemplated will be detrimental to the orderly and peaceful progress of affairs. The Government's decision was, at the time of writing, still pending, and we sincerely hope it will be in favour of the Balinese and their friends; anyway the missionaries have plenty to do in Europe itself.

The Maharaja of Mysore in opening the eighth annual session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, held last December, drew attention to the fact of "an increasing recognition of the interrelation of the sciences not only with one another but with the co-ordinated consideration of them all which belongs to philosophy". He pointed out how scientists like Bergson and Eddington and mathematicians like Bertrand Russell and Poincaré are "impelled by the logic of facts to pass on from science to philosophy". As regards the relationship of

philosophy to religious thought, he said:—

Religions are apt to be too closely associated with particular territorial boundaries. Philosophy is free from such associations; but by its very nature it is confined to an aristocracy of learned men. But each can help the other. Philosophy can aid religion by inducing the clarity of thought which tends to purify it and to disperse the clouds that obscure the truth. Religion can aid philosophy by spreading abroad to the people at large the truths that philosophy has thus revealed. In the last resort the good and true will meet in the God of Religion, the Absolute of Philosophy.

In his Presidential Address, Sir S. Radhakrishnan described the morality that obtains to-day as "conventional," "mechanical respectability". In support of which view, as regards the West he said:—

According to the Dean of St. Paul's, if anybody told a Bishop that he was not a Christian he would not take offence, but if he was told he was not a gentleman he took great offence. Christianity meant heroism and magnificent adventure. They were not capable of those passions. They were stifling themselves in order to keep well with the world. A gentleman was one who believed in the virtue of good form. A gentleman meant now one who had the outer appearance of virtue but a secret appearance of vice.

But despite this, Sir S. Radhakrishnan visioned a happier future in which "if philosophers were true to their mission they ought to be able to evolve a new form of philosophy and religion which would fulfil the intellectual conditions of their time and make them feel at home in this world".